when to send what to which, prevent recursion by introducing new COMMERROR
elog level for client-communication problems, get rid of direct writes
to stderr in backend/libpq files, prevent non-error elogs from going to
client during the authentication cycle.
now just below FATAL in server_min_messages. Added more text to
highlight ordering difference between it and client_min_messages.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
REALLYFATAL => PANIC
STOP => PANIC
New INFO level the prints to client by default
New LOG level the prints to server log by default
Cause VACUUM information to print only to the client
NOTICE => INFO where purely information messages are sent
DEBUG => LOG for purely server status messages
DEBUG removed, kept as backward compatible
DEBUG5, DEBUG4, DEBUG3, DEBUG2, DEBUG1 added
DebugLvl removed in favor of new DEBUG[1-5] symbols
New server_min_messages GUC parameter with values:
DEBUG[5-1], INFO, NOTICE, ERROR, LOG, FATAL, PANIC
New client_min_messages GUC parameter with values:
DEBUG[5-1], LOG, INFO, NOTICE, ERROR, FATAL, PANIC
Server startup now logged with LOG instead of DEBUG
Remove debug_level GUC parameter
elog() numbers now start at 10
Add test to print error message if older elog() values are passed to elog()
Bootstrap mode now has a -d that requires an argument, like postmaster
> and that the right fix is to make each of the subsequent calls be in
> this same pattern, not to try to emulate their nonsensical style.
Dominic J. Eidson
authentication failed' and a 'send() failed: Broken pipe' message
on every connection from psql in password auth mode. Problem is
that psql doesn't ask user for a password until it sees a password
challenge failure, and libpq just closes the connection unceremoniously
if it's challenged for a password when it hasn't got one to send.
Accordingly, EOF from the client after asking for a password is
normal behavior and should not result in postmaster log entries.
> pam_strerror() should be used a few more times, rather than just saying
> "Error!". Also, the configure.in snippet seems wrong. You add
> -I$pam_prefix/include/security to $INCLUDES and then you #include
> <security/pam_appl.h>. This whole thing is probably unnecessary, since
> PAM is a system library on the systems where it exists, so the headers
> and libraries are found automatically, unlike OpenSSL and
> Kerberos.
See attached revised patch. (I'm sure the configure.in stuff can be done
right/better, I'm just not enough of a autoconf guru to know what to
change it to.)
Dominic J. Eidson
Allow pg_shadow to be MD5 encrypted.
Add ENCRYPTED/UNENCRYPTED option to CREATE/ALTER user.
Add password_encryption postgresql.conf option.
Update wire protocol version to 2.1.
system supports SO_PEERCRED requests for Unix sockets. This is an
amalgamation of patches submitted by Helge Bahmann and Oliver Elphick,
with some editorializing by yours truly.
a new postmaster child process. This should eliminate problems with
authentication blocking (e.g., ident, SSL init) and also reduce problems
with the accept queue filling up under heavy load.
The option to send elog output to a different file per backend (postgres -o)
has been disabled for now because the initialization would have to happen
in a different order and it's not clear we want to keep this anyway.
(rather than compile time). For libpq, even when Kerberos support is
compiled in, the default user name should still fall back to geteuid()
if it can't be determined via the Kerberos system.
A couple of fixes for string type configuration parameters, now that there
is one.
files to restrict the set of users that can connect to a database
but can still use the pg_shadow password. (You just leave off the
password field in the secondary file.)
Most (nearly all) of the work was done by David Wragg <dpw@doc.ic.ac.uk>
He patched 6.5.3. I've updated it for 7.0RC5.
It works for MIT kerberos 1.1.1 (and previously for 1.0.6 as well).
I've got the patch against 6.5.3, plus kerberized RPMS.
Mike Wyer <mw@doc.ic.ac.uk> || "Woof?"
When drawing up a very simple "text-drawing" of how the negotiation is done,
I realised I had done this last part (fallback) in a very stupid way. Patch
#4 fixes this, and does it in a much better way.
Included is also the simple text-drawing of how the negotiation is done.
//Magnus
authentifica
tion
working with postgresql-6.4.2 and KTH-KRB Ebones
(http://www.pdc.kth.se/kth-kr
b) on a dec alpha running DU 4.0D using the native compiler. The
following
patch does the trick.
The rationale behind this is as follows. The KTH-KRB code header files
defines
lots of lengths like INST_SZ,REALM_SZ and KRB_SENDAUTH_VLEN. It also has
a
habit of doing things like
chararray[LENGTH] = '\0'
to ensure null terminated strings. In my instance this just happens to
blat
the kerberos principal instance string leading to error like
pg_krb4_recvauth: kerberos error: Can't decode authenticator
(krb_rd_req
)
The application code that comes with KTH-KRB uses "KRB_SENDAUTH_VLEN +
1" and
sometimes uses "INST_SZ + 1" so it seems safest to put that 1 char
buffer in
the appropriate place.
Rodney McDuff
Making PQrequestCancel safe to call in a signal handler turned out to be
much easier than I feared. So here are the diffs.
Some notes:
* I modified the postmaster's packet "iodone" callback interface to allow
the callback routine to return a continue-or-drop-connection return
code; this was necessary to allow the connection to be closed after
receiving a Cancel, rather than proceeding to launch a new backend...
Being a neatnik, I also made the iodone proc have a typechecked
parameter list.
* I deleted all code I could find that had to do with OOB.
* I made some edits to ensure that all signals mentioned in the code
are referred to symbolically not by numbers ("SIGUSR2" not "2").
I think Bruce may have already done at least some of the same edits;
I hope that merging these patches is not too painful.
