One improbable error-exit path in this function used close() where
it should have used CloseTransientFile(). This is unlikely to be
hit in the field, and I think the consequences wouldn't be awful
(just an elog(LOG) bleat later). But a bug is a bug, so back-patch
to 9.4 where this code came in.
Pan Bian
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/152056616579.4966.583293218357089052@wrigleys.postgresql.org
XactLockTableWait assumed that its xid argument has already added itself
to the lock table. That assumption led to another assumption that if
locking the xid has succeeded but the xid is reported as still in
progress, then the input xid must have been a subtransaction.
These assumptions hold true for the original uses of this code in
locking related to on-disk tuples, but they break down in logical
replication slot snapshot building -- in particular, when a standby
snapshot logged contains an xid that's already in ProcArray but not yet
in the lock table. This leads to assertion failures that can be
reproduced all the way back to 9.4, when logical decoding was
introduced.
To fix, change SubTransGetParent to SubTransGetTopmostTransaction which
has a slightly different API: it returns the argument Xid if there is no
parent, and it goes all the way to the top instead of moving up the
levels one by one. Also, to avoid busy-waiting, add a 1ms sleep to give
the other process time to register itself in the lock table.
For consistency, change ConditionalXactLockTableWait the same way.
Author: Petr Jelínek
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/1B3E32D8-FCF4-40B4-AEF9-5C0E3AC57969@postgrespro.ru
Reported-by: Konstantin Knizhnik
Diagnosed-by: Stas Kelvich, Petr Jelínek
Reviewed-by: Andres Freund, Robert Haas
This patch fixes a couple of low-probability bugs that could lead to
reporting an irrelevant errno value (and hence possibly a wrong SQLSTATE)
concerning directory-open or file-open failures. It also fixes places
where we took shortcuts in reporting such errors, either by using elog
instead of ereport or by using ereport but forgetting to specify an
errcode. And it eliminates a lot of just plain redundant error-handling
code.
In service of all this, export fd.c's formerly-static function
ReadDirExtended, so that external callers can make use of the coding
pattern
dir = AllocateDir(path);
while ((de = ReadDirExtended(dir, path, LOG)) != NULL)
if they'd like to treat directory-open failures as mere LOG conditions
rather than errors. Also fix FreeDir to be a no-op if we reach it
with dir == NULL, as such a coding pattern would cause.
Then, remove code at many call sites that was throwing an error or log
message for AllocateDir failure, as ReadDir or ReadDirExtended can handle
that job just fine. Aside from being a net code savings, this gets rid of
a lot of not-quite-up-to-snuff reports, as mentioned above. (In some
places these changes result in replacing a custom error message such as
"could not open tablespace directory" with more generic wording "could not
open directory", but it was agreed that the custom wording buys little as
long as we report the directory name.) In some other call sites where we
can't just remove code, change the error reports to be fully
project-style-compliant.
Also reorder code in restoreTwoPhaseData that was acquiring a lock
between AllocateDir and ReadDir; in the unlikely but surely not
impossible case that LWLockAcquire changes errno, AllocateDir failures
would be misreported. There is no great value in opening the directory
before acquiring TwoPhaseStateLock, so just do it in the other order.
Also fix CheckXLogRemoved to guarantee that it preserves errno,
as quite a number of call sites are implicitly assuming. (Again,
it's unlikely but I think not impossible that errno could change
during a SpinLockAcquire. If so, this function was broken for its
own purposes as well as breaking callers.)
And change a few places that were using not-per-project-style messages,
such as "could not read directory" when "could not open directory" is
more correct.
Back-patch the exporting of ReadDirExtended, in case we have occasion
to back-patch some fix that makes use of it; it's not needed right now
but surely making it global is pretty harmless. Also back-patch the
restoreTwoPhaseData and CheckXLogRemoved fixes. The rest of this is
essentially cosmetic and need not get back-patched.
Michael Paquier, with a bit of additional work by me
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAB7nPqRpOCxjiirHmebEFhXVTK7V5Jvw4bz82p7Oimtsm3TyZA@mail.gmail.com
The point of having separate ResourceOwnerEnlargeFoo and
ResourceOwnerRememberFoo functions is so that resource allocation
can happen in between. Doing it in some other order is just wrong.
OpenTemporaryFile() did open(), enlarge, remember, which would leak the
open file if the enlarge step ran out of memory. Because fd.c has its own
layer of resource-remembering, the consequences look like they'd be limited
to an intratransaction FD leak, but it's still not good.
IncrBufferRefCount() did enlarge, remember, incr-refcount, which would blow
up if the incr-refcount step ever failed. It was safe enough when written,
but since the introduction of PrivateRefCountHash, I think the assumption
that no error could happen there is pretty shaky.
The odds of real problems from either bug are probably small, but still,
back-patch to supported branches.
Thomas Munro and Tom Lane, per a comment from Andres Freund
posix_fallocate() is not quite a drop-in replacement for fallocate(),
because it is defined to return the error code as its function result,
not in "errno". I (tgl) missed this because RHEL6's version seems
to set errno as well. That is not the case on more modern Linuxen,
though, as per buildfarm results.
Aside from fixing the return-convention confusion, remove the test
for ENOSYS; we expect that glibc will mask that for posix_fallocate,
though it does not for fallocate. Keep the test for EINTR, because
POSIX specifies that as a possible result, and buildfarm results
suggest that it can happen in practice.
Back-patch to 9.4, like the previous commit.
Thomas Munro
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/1002664500.12301802.1471008223422.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com
On Linux, shared memory segments created with shm_open() are backed by
swap files created in tmpfs. If the swap file needs to be extended,
but there's no tmpfs space left, you get a very unfriendly SIGBUS trap.
To avoid this, force allocation of the full request size when we create
the segment. This adds a few cycles, but none that we wouldn't expend
later anyway, assuming the request isn't hugely bigger than the actual
need.
Make this code #ifdef __linux__, because (a) there's not currently a
reason to think the same problem exists on other platforms, and (b)
applying posix_fallocate() to an FD created by shm_open() isn't very
portable anyway.
Back-patch to 9.4 where the DSM code came in.
Thomas Munro, per a bug report from Amul Sul
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/1002664500.12301802.1471008223422.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com
Although not confirmed and probably rare, if the newly allocated memory
is not already zero, this could possibly have caused some problems.
Also reorder the initializations slightly so they match the order of the
struct definition.
Author: Wong, Yi Wen <yiwong@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Masahiko Sawada <sawada.mshk@gmail.com>
Trading a little too heavily on letting the code path be the same whether
we were creating shared data structures or only attaching to them,
InitPredicateLocks() inserted the "scratch" PredicateLockTargetHash entry
unconditionally. This is just wrong if we're in a postmaster child,
which would only reach this code in EXEC_BACKEND builds. Most of the
time, the hash_search(HASH_ENTER) call would simply report that the
entry already existed, causing no visible effect since the code did not
bother to check for that possibility. However, if this happened while
some other backend had transiently removed the "scratch" entry, then
that other backend's eventual RestoreScratchTarget would suffer an
assert failure; this appears to be the explanation for a recent failure
on buildfarm member culicidae. In non-assert builds, there would be
no visible consequences there either. But nonetheless this is a pretty
bad bug for EXEC_BACKEND builds, for two reasons:
1. Each new backend would perform the hash_search(HASH_ENTER) call
without holding any lock that would prevent concurrent access to the
PredicateLockTargetHash hash table. This creates a low but certainly
nonzero risk of corruption of that hash table.
2. In the event that the race condition occurred, by reinserting the
scratch entry too soon, we were defeating the entire purpose of the
scratch entry, namely to guarantee that transaction commit could move
hash table entries around with no risk of out-of-memory failure.
The odds of an actual OOM failure are quite low, but not zero, and if
it did happen it would again result in corruption of the hash table.
The user-visible symptoms of such corruption are a little hard to predict,
but would presumably amount to misbehavior of SERIALIZABLE transactions
that'd require a crash or postmaster restart to fix.
To fix, just skip the hash insertion if IsUnderPostmaster. I also
inserted a bunch of assertions that the expected things happen
depending on whether IsUnderPostmaster is true. That might be overkill,
since most comparable code in other functions isn't quite that paranoid,
but once burnt twice shy.
In passing, also move a couple of lines to places where they seemed
to make more sense.
Diagnosis of problem by Thomas Munro, patch by me. Back-patch to
all supported branches.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/10593.1500670709@sss.pgh.pa.us
The race condition goes like this:
1. GetNewTransactionId advances nextXid e.g. from 100 to 101
2. GetOldestActiveTransactionId reads the new nextXid, 101
3. GetOldestActiveTransactionId loops through the proc array. There are no
active XIDs there, so it returns 101 as the oldest active XID.
4. GetNewTransactionid stores XID 100 to MyPgXact->xid
So, GetOldestActiveTransactionId returned XID 101, even though 100 only
just started and is surely still running.
This would be hard to hit in practice, and even harder to spot any ill
effect if it happens. GetOldestActiveTransactionId is only used when
creating a checkpoint in a master server, and the race condition can only
happen on an online checkpoint, as there are no backends running during a
shutdown checkpoint. The oldestActiveXid value of an online checkpoint is
only used when starting up a hot standby server, to determine the starting
point where pg_subtrans is initialized from. For the race condition to
happen, there must be no other XIDs in the proc array that would hold back
the oldest-active XID value, which means that the missed XID must be a top
transaction's XID. However, pg_subtrans is not used for top XIDs, so I
believe an off-by-one error is in fact inconsequential. Nevertheless, let's
fix it, as it's clearly wrong and the fix is simple.
This has been wrong ever since hot standby was introduced, so backport to
all supported versions.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/e7258662-82b6-7a45-56d4-99b337a32bf7@iki.fi
When the checkpointer writes the shutdown checkpoint, it checks
afterwards whether any WAL has been written since it started and
throws a PANIC if so. At that point, only walsenders are still
active, so one might think this could not happen, but walsenders can
also generate WAL, for instance in BASE_BACKUP and logical decoding
related commands (e.g. via hint bits). So they can trigger this panic
if such a command is run while the shutdown checkpoint is being
written.
To fix this, divide the walsender shutdown into two phases. First,
checkpointer, itself triggered by postmaster, sends a
PROCSIG_WALSND_INIT_STOPPING signal to all walsenders. If the backend
is idle or runs an SQL query this causes the backend to shutdown, if
logical replication is in progress all existing WAL records are
processed followed by a shutdown. Otherwise this causes the walsender
to switch to the "stopping" state. In this state, the walsender will
reject any further replication commands. The checkpointer begins the
shutdown checkpoint once all walsenders are confirmed as
stopping. When the shutdown checkpoint finishes, the postmaster sends
us SIGUSR2. This instructs walsender to send any outstanding WAL,
including the shutdown checkpoint record, wait for it to be replicated
to the standby, and then exit.
Author: Andres Freund, based on an earlier patch by Michael Paquier
Reported-By: Fujii Masao, Andres Freund
Reviewed-By: Michael Paquier
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20170602002912.tqlwn4gymzlxpvs2@alap3.anarazel.de
Backpatch: 9.4, where logical decoding was introduced
The logical decoding machinery already preserved all the required
catalog tuples, which is sufficient in the course of normal logical
decoding, but did not guarantee that non-catalog tuples were preserved
during computation of the initial snapshot when creating a slot over
the replication protocol.
This could cause a corrupted initial snapshot being exported. The
time window for issues is usually not terribly large, but on a busy
server it's perfectly possible to it hit it. Ongoing decoding is not
affected by this bug.
To avoid increased overhead for the SQL API, only retain additional
tuples when a logical slot is being created over the replication
protocol. To do so this commit changes the signature of
CreateInitDecodingContext(), but it seems unlikely that it's being
used in an extension, so that's probably ok.
In a drive-by fix, fix handling of
ReplicationSlotsComputeRequiredXmin's already_locked argument, which
should only apply to ProcArrayLock, not ReplicationSlotControlLock.
Reported-By: Erik Rijkers
Analyzed-By: Petr Jelinek
Author: Petr Jelinek, heavily editorialized by Andres Freund
Reviewed-By: Andres Freund
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/9a897b86-46e1-9915-ee4c-da02e4ff6a95@2ndquadrant.com
Backport: 9.4, where logical decoding was introduced.
This could result in corruption of the init fork of an unlogged index
if the ambuildempty routine for that index used shared buffers to
create the init fork, which was true for brin, gin, gist, and hash
indexes.
Patch by me, based on an earlier patch by Michael Paquier, who also
reviewed this one. This also incorporates an idea from Artur
Zakirov.
Discussion: http://postgr.es/m/CACYUyc8yccE4xfxhqxfh_Mh38j7dRFuxfaK1p6dSNAEUakxUyQ@mail.gmail.com
Several places in fd.c had badly-thought-through handling of error returns
from lseek() and close(). The fact that those would seldom fail on valid
FDs is probably the reason we've not noticed this up to now; but if they
did fail, we'd get quite confused.
LruDelete and LruInsert actually just Assert'd that lseek never fails,
which is pretty awful on its face.
In LruDelete, we indeed can't throw an error, because that's likely to get
called during error abort and so throwing an error would probably just lead
to an infinite loop. But by the same token, throwing an error from the
close() right after that was ill-advised, not to mention that it would've
left the LRU state corrupted since we'd already unlinked the VFD from the
list. I also noticed that really, most of the time, we should know the
current seek position and it shouldn't be necessary to do an lseek here at
all. As patched, if we don't have a seek position and an lseek attempt
doesn't give us one, we'll close the file but then subsequent re-open
attempts will fail (except in the somewhat-unlikely case that a
FileSeek(SEEK_SET) call comes between and allows us to re-establish a known
target seek position). This isn't great but it won't result in any state
corruption.
Meanwhile, having an Assert instead of an honest test in LruInsert is
really dangerous: if that lseek failed, a subsequent read or write would
read or write from the start of the file, not where the caller expected,
leading to data corruption.
In both LruDelete and FileClose, if close() fails, just LOG that and mark
the VFD closed anyway. Possibly leaking an FD is preferable to getting
into an infinite loop or corrupting the VFD list. Besides, as far as I can
tell from the POSIX spec, it's unspecified whether or not the file has been
closed, so treating it as still open could be the wrong thing anyhow.
I also fixed a number of other places that were being sloppy about
behaving correctly when the seekPos is unknown.
Also, I changed FileSeek to return -1 with EINVAL for the cases where it
detects a bad offset, rather than throwing a hard elog(ERROR). It seemed
pretty inconsistent that some bad-offset cases would get a failure return
while others got elog(ERROR). It was missing an offset validity check for
the SEEK_CUR case on a closed file, too.
Back-patch to all supported branches, since all this code is fundamentally
identical in all of them.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/2982.1487617365@sss.pgh.pa.us
Rearrange a bit of code to ensure that 'mode' in LWLockRelease is
obviously always set, which seems a bit cleaner and avoids a compiler
warning (thanks to Robert for the suggestion!).
Back-patch back to 9.5 where the warning is first seen.
Author: Stephen Frost
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20161129152102.GR13284%40tamriel.snowman.net
When a relation is truncated, it is important that the FSM is truncated as
well. Otherwise, after recovery, the FSM can return a page that has been
truncated away, leading to errors like:
ERROR: could not read block 28991 in file "base/16390/572026": read only 0
of 8192 bytes
We were using MarkBufferDirtyHint() to dirty the buffer holding the last
remaining page of the FSM, but during recovery, that might in fact not
dirty the page, and the FSM update might be lost.
To fix, use the stronger MarkBufferDirty() function. MarkBufferDirty()
requires us to do WAL-logging ourselves, to protect from a torn page, if
checksumming is enabled.
Also fix an oversight in visibilitymap_truncate: it also needs to WAL-log
when checksumming is enabled.
Analysis by Pavan Deolasee.
Discussion: <CABOikdNr5vKucqyZH9s1Mh0XebLs_jRhKv6eJfNnD2wxTn=_9A@mail.gmail.com>
Backpatch to 9.3, where we got data checksums.
We must test GetLastError() even when CreateFileMapping() returns a
non-null handle. If that value were left over from some previous system
call, we might be fooled into thinking the segment already existed.
Experimentation on Windows 7 suggests that CreateFileMapping() clears
the error code on success, but it is not documented to do so, so let's
not rely on that happening in all Windows releases.
Amit Kapila
Discussion: <20811.1474390987@sss.pgh.pa.us>
Commits 470d886c3 et al intended to fix the problem that the postmaster
selected the same "random" DSM control segment ID on every start. But
using PostmasterRandom() for that destroys the intended property that the
delay between random_start_time and random_stop_time will be unpredictable.
(Said delay is probably already more predictable than we could wish, but
that doesn't mean that reducing it by a couple orders of magnitude is OK.)
Revert the previous patch and add a comment warning against misuse of
PostmasterRandom. Fix the original problem by calling srandom() early in
PostmasterMain, using a low-security seed that will later be overwritten
by PostmasterRandom.
Discussion: <20789.1474390434@sss.pgh.pa.us>
Otherwise, attempts to run multiple postmasters running on the same
machine may fail, because Windows sometimes returns ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED
rather than ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS when there is an existing segment.
Hitting this bug is much more likely because of another defect not
fixed by this patch, namely that dsm_postmaster_startup() uses
random() which returns the same value every time. But that's not
a reason not to fix this.
Kyotaro Horiguchi and Amit Kapila, reviewed by Michael Paquier
Discussion: <CAA4eK1JyNdMeF-dgrpHozDecpDfsRZUtpCi+1AbtuEkfG3YooQ@mail.gmail.com>
mdtruncate() forgot to FileClose() a segment's mdfd_vfd, when deleting
it. That lead to a fd.c handle to a truncated file being kept open until
backend exit.
The issue appears to have been introduced way back in 1a5c450f30,
before that the handle was closed inside FileUnlink().
The impact of this bug is limited - only VACUUM and ON COMMIT TRUNCATE
for temporary tables, truncate files in place (i.e. TRUNCATE itself is
not affected), and the relation has to be bigger than 1GB. The
consequences of a leaked fd.c handle aren't severe either.
Discussion: <20160908220748.oqh37ukwqqncbl3n@alap3.anarazel.de>
Backpatch: all supported releases
This coding pattern creates a race condition, because if an interesting
interrupt happens after we've checked InterruptPending but before we reset
our latch, the latch-setting done by the signal handler would get lost,
and then we might block at WaitLatch in the next iteration without ever
noticing the interrupt condition. You can put the CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS
before WaitLatch or after ResetLatch, but not between them.
Aside from fixing the bugs, add some explanatory comments to latch.h
to perhaps forestall the next person from making the same mistake.
In HEAD, also replace gather_readnext's direct call of
HandleParallelMessages with CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS. It does not seem clean
or useful for this one caller to bypass ProcessInterrupts and go straight
to HandleParallelMessages; not least because that fails to consider the
InterruptPending flag, resulting in useless work both here
(if InterruptPending isn't set) and in the next CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS call
(if it is).
This thinko seems to have been introduced in the initial coding of
storage/ipc/shm_mq.c (commit ec9037df2), and then blindly copied into all
the subsequent parallel-query support logic. Back-patch relevant hunks
to 9.4 to extirpate the error everywhere.
Discussion: <1661.1469996911@sss.pgh.pa.us>
BRIN was relying on the ability to remove a tuple from an index page,
then putting another tuple in the same line pointer. But PageAddItem
refuses to add a tuple beyond the first free item past the last used
item, and in particular, it rejects an attempt to add an item to an
empty page anywhere other than the first line pointer. PageAddItem
issues a WARNING and indicates to the caller that it failed, which in
turn causes the BRIN calling code to issue a PANIC, so the whole
sequence looks like this:
WARNING: specified item offset is too large
PANIC: failed to add BRIN tuple
To fix, create a new function PageAddItemExtended which is like
PageAddItem except that the two boolean arguments become a flags bitmap;
the "overwrite" and "is_heap" boolean flags in PageAddItem become
PAI_OVERWITE and PAI_IS_HEAP flags in the new function, and a new flag
PAI_ALLOW_FAR_OFFSET enables the behavior required by BRIN.
PageAddItem() retains its original signature, for compatibility with
third-party modules (other callers in core code are not modified,
either).
Also, in the belt-and-suspenders spirit, I added a new sanity check in
brinGetTupleForHeapBlock to raise an error if an TID found in the revmap
is not marked as live by the page header. This causes it to react with
"ERROR: corrupted BRIN index" to the bug at hand, rather than a hard
crash.
Backpatch to 9.5.
Bug reported by Andreas Seltenreich as detected by his handy sqlsmith
fuzzer.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/87mvni77jh.fsf@elite.ansel.ydns.eu
Renaming a file using rename(2) is not guaranteed to be durable in face
of crashes; especially on filesystems like xfs and ext4 when mounted
with data=writeback. To be certain that a rename() atomically replaces
the previous file contents in the face of crashes and different
filesystems, one has to fsync the old filename, rename the file, fsync
the new filename, fsync the containing directory. This sequence is not
generally adhered to currently; which exposes us to data loss risks. To
avoid having to repeat this arduous sequence, introduce
durable_rename(), which wraps all that.
Also add durable_link_or_rename(). Several places use link() (with a
fallback to rename()) to rename a file, trying to avoid replacing the
target file out of paranoia. Some of those rename sequences need to be
durable as well. There seems little reason extend several copies of the
same logic, so centralize the link() callers.
This commit does not yet make use of the new functions; they're used in
a followup commit.
Author: Michael Paquier, Andres Freund
Discussion: 56583BDD.9060302@2ndquadrant.com
Backpatch: All supported branches
In 4b4b680c3 I accidentally used sizeof(PrivateRefCountArray) instead of
sizeof(PrivateRefCountEntry) when creating the refcount overflow
hashtable. As the former is bigger than the latter, this luckily only
resulted in a slightly increased memory usage when many buffers are
pinned in a backend.
Reported-By: Takashi Horikawa
Discussion: 73FA3881462C614096F815F75628AFCD035A48C3@BPXM01GP.gisp.nec.co.jp
Backpatch: 9.5, where thew new ref count infrastructure was introduced
e3f4cfc7 introduced a LWLockHeldByMe() call, without the corresponding
Assert() surrounding it.
Spotted by Coverity.
Backpatch: 9.1+, like the previous commit
At the end of crash recovery, unlogged relations are reset to the empty
state, using their init fork as the template. The init fork is copied to
the main fork without going through shared buffers. Unfortunately WAL
replay so far has not necessarily flushed writes from shared buffers to
disk at that point. In normal crash recovery, and before the
introduction of 'fast promotions' in fd4ced523 / 9.3, the
END_OF_RECOVERY checkpoint flushes the buffers out in time. But with
fast promotions that's not the case anymore.
To fix, force WAL writes targeting the init fork to be flushed
immediately (using the new FlushOneBuffer() function). In 9.5+ that
flush can centrally be triggered from the code dealing with restoring
full page writes (XLogReadBufferForRedoExtended), in earlier releases
that responsibility is in the hands of XLOG_HEAP_NEWPAGE's replay
function.
Backpatch to 9.1, even if this currently is only known to trigger in
9.3+. Flushing earlier is more robust, and it is advantageous to keep
the branches similar.
Typical symptoms of this bug are errors like
'ERROR: index "..." contains unexpected zero page at block 0'
shortly after promoting a node.
Reported-By: Thom Brown
Author: Andres Freund and Michael Paquier
Discussion: 20150326175024.GJ451@alap3.anarazel.de
Backpatch: 9.1-
Commit a1480ec1d3 purported to fix the
problems with commit b2ccb5f4e6, but it
didn't completely fix them. The problem is that the checks were
performed in the wrong order, leading to a race condition. If the
sender attached, sent a message, and detached after the receiver
called shm_mq_get_sender and before the receiver called
shm_mq_counterparty_gone, we'd incorrectly return SHM_MQ_DETACHED
before all messages were read. Repair by reversing the order of
operations, and add a long comment explaining why this new logic is
(hopefully) correct.
On insert the CheckForSerializableConflictIn() test was performed
before the page(s) which were going to be modified had been locked
(with an exclusive buffer content lock). If another process
acquired a relation SIReadLock on the heap and scanned to a page on
which an insert was going to occur before the page was so locked,
a rw-conflict would be missed, which could allow a serialization
anomaly to be missed. The window between the check and the page
lock was small, so the bug was generally not noticed unless there
was high concurrency with multiple processes inserting into the
same table.
This was reported by Peter Bailis as bug #11732, by Sean Chittenden
as bug #13667, and by others.
The race condition was eliminated in heap_insert() by moving the
check down below the acquisition of the buffer lock, which had been
the very next statement. Because of the loop locking and unlocking
multiple buffers in heap_multi_insert() a check was added after all
inserts were completed. The check before the start of the inserts
was left because it might avoid a large amount of work to detect a
serialization anomaly before performing the all of the inserts and
the related WAL logging.
While investigating this bug, other SSI bugs which were even harder
to hit in practice were noticed and fixed, an unnecessary check
(covered by another check, so redundant) was removed from
heap_update(), and comments were improved.
Back-patch to all supported branches.
Kevin Grittner and Thomas Munro
If the counterparty writes some data into the queue and then detaches,
it's wrong to return SHM_MQ_DETACHED right away. If we do that, we
fail to read whatever was written.
The shm_mq mechanism was intended to optionally notice when the process
on the other end of the queue fails to attach to the queue. It does
this by allowing the user to pass a BackgroundWorkerHandle; if the
background worker in question is launched and dies without attaching
to the queue, then we know it never will. This logic works OK in
blocking mode, but when called with nowait = true we fail to notice
that this has happened due to an asymmetry in the logic. Repair.
Reported off-list by Rushabh Lathia. Patch by me.
Commit 2bd9e412f9 introduced a mechanism
for relaying protocol messages from a background worker to another
backend via a shm_mq. However, there was no provision for shutting
down the communication channel. Therefore, a protocol message sent
late in the shutdown sequence, such as a DEBUG message resulting from
cranking up log_min_messages, could crash the server. To fix, install
an on_dsm_detach callback that disables sending messages to the shm_mq
when the associated DSM is detached.
RemoveLocalLock() must consider the possibility that LockAcquireExtended()
failed to palloc the initial space for a locallock's lockOwners array.
I had evidently meant to cope with this hazard when the code was originally
written (commit 1785acebf2), but missed that
the pfree needed to be protected with an if-test. Just to make sure things
are left in a clean state, reset numLockOwners as well.
Per low-memory testing by Andreas Seltenreich. Back-patch to all supported
branches.
In 4b4b680c I passed a buffer index number (starting from 0) instead of
a proper Buffer id (which start from 1 for shared buffers) in two
places.
This wasn't noticed so far as one of those locations isn't compiled at
all (PrintPinnedBufs) and the other one (InvalidBuffer) requires a
unlikely, but possible, set of circumstances to trigger a symptom.
To reduce the likelihood of such incidents a bit also convert existing
open coded mappings from buffer descriptors to buffer ids with
BufferDescriptorGetBuffer().
Author: Qingqing Zhou
Reported-By: Qingqing Zhou
Discussion: CAJjS0u2ai9ooUisKtkV8cuVUtEkMTsbK8c7juNAjv8K11zeCQg@mail.gmail.com
Backpatch: 9.5 where the private ref count infrastructure was introduced
If some, but not all, of the length word has already been read, and the
next attempt to read sees exactly the number of bytes needed to complete
the length word, or fewer, then we'll incorrectly read less than all of
the available data.
Antonin Houska
LWLockAttemptLock pointlessly read the lock's state in every loop
iteration, even though pg_atomic_compare_exchange_u32() returns the old
value. Instead do that only once before the loop iteration.
Additionally there's no need to have the expected_state variable,
old_state mostly had the same value anyway.
Noticed-By: Heikki Linnakangas
Backpatch: 9.5, no reason to let the branches diverge at this point
The lwlock scalability work introduced two race conditions into the
lwlock variable support provided for xlog.c. First, and harmlessly on
most platforms, it set/read the variable without the spinlock in some
places. Secondly, due to the removal of the spinlock, it was possible
that a backend missed changes to the variable's state if it changed in
the wrong moment because checking the lock's state, the variable's state
and the queuing are not protected by a single spinlock acquisition
anymore.
To fix first move resetting the variable's from LWLockAcquireWithVar to
WALInsertLockRelease, via a new function LWLockReleaseClearVar. That
prevents issues around waiting for a variable's value to change when a
new locker has acquired the lock, but not yet set the value. Secondly
re-check that the variable hasn't changed after enqueing, that prevents
the issue that the lock has been released and already re-acquired by the
time the woken up backend checks for the lock's state.
Reported-By: Jeff Janes
Analyzed-By: Heikki Linnakangas
Reviewed-By: Heikki Linnakangas
Discussion: 5592DB35.2060401@iki.fi
Backpatch: 9.5, where the lwlock scalability went in
