MERGE performs actions that modify rows in the target table using a
source table or query. MERGE provides a single SQL statement that can
conditionally INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE rows -- a task that would otherwise
require multiple PL statements. For example,
MERGE INTO target AS t
USING source AS s
ON t.tid = s.sid
WHEN MATCHED AND t.balance > s.delta THEN
UPDATE SET balance = t.balance - s.delta
WHEN MATCHED THEN
DELETE
WHEN NOT MATCHED AND s.delta > 0 THEN
INSERT VALUES (s.sid, s.delta)
WHEN NOT MATCHED THEN
DO NOTHING;
MERGE works with regular tables, partitioned tables and inheritance
hierarchies, including column and row security enforcement, as well as
support for row and statement triggers and transition tables therein.
MERGE is optimized for OLTP and is parameterizable, though also useful
for large scale ETL/ELT. MERGE is not intended to be used in preference
to existing single SQL commands for INSERT, UPDATE or DELETE since there
is some overhead. MERGE can be used from PL/pgSQL.
MERGE does not support targetting updatable views or foreign tables, and
RETURNING clauses are not allowed either. These limitations are likely
fixable with sufficient effort. Rewrite rules are also not supported,
but it's not clear that we'd want to support them.
Author: Pavan Deolasee <pavan.deolasee@gmail.com>
Author: Álvaro Herrera <alvherre@alvh.no-ip.org>
Author: Amit Langote <amitlangote09@gmail.com>
Author: Simon Riggs <simon.riggs@enterprisedb.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Eisentraut <peter.eisentraut@enterprisedb.com>
Reviewed-by: Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de> (earlier versions)
Reviewed-by: Peter Geoghegan <pg@bowt.ie> (earlier versions)
Reviewed-by: Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com> (earlier versions)
Reviewed-by: Japin Li <japinli@hotmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Justin Pryzby <pryzby@telsasoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Vondra <tomas.vondra@enterprisedb.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhihong Yu <zyu@yugabyte.com>
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CANP8+jKitBSrB7oTgT9CY2i1ObfOt36z0XMraQc+Xrz8QB0nXA@mail.gmail.com
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAH2-WzkJdBuxj9PO=2QaO9-3h3xGbQPZ34kJH=HukRekwM-GZg@mail.gmail.com
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20201231134736.GA25392@alvherre.pgsql
A security invoker view checks permissions for accessing its
underlying base relations using the privileges of the user of the
view, rather than the privileges of the view owner. Additionally, if
any of the base relations are tables with RLS enabled, the policies of
the user of the view are applied, rather than those of the view owner.
This allows views to be defined without giving away additional
privileges on the underlying base relations, and matches a similar
feature available in other database systems.
It also allows views to operate more naturally with RLS, without
affecting the assignments of policies to users.
Christoph Heiss, with some additional hacking by me. Reviewed by
Laurenz Albe and Wolfgang Walther.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/b66dd6d6-ad3e-c6f2-8b90-47be773da240%40cybertec.at
This reverts commits d204ef6377,
83454e3c2b and a few more commits thereafter
(complete list at the end) related to MERGE feature.
While the feature was fully functional, with sufficient test coverage and
necessary documentation, it was felt that some parts of the executor and
parse-analyzer can use a different design and it wasn't possible to do that in
the available time. So it was decided to revert the patch for PG11 and retry
again in the future.
Thanks again to all reviewers and bug reporters.
List of commits reverted, in reverse chronological order:
f1464c5380 Improve parse representation for MERGE
ddb4158579 MERGE syntax diagram correction
530e69e59b Allow cpluspluscheck to pass by renaming variable
01b88b4df5 MERGE minor errata
3af7b2b0d4 MERGE fix variable warning in non-assert builds
a5d86181ec MERGE INSERT allows only one VALUES clause
4b2d44031f MERGE post-commit review
4923550c20 Tab completion for MERGE
aa3faa3c7a WITH support in MERGE
83454e3c2b New files for MERGE
d204ef6377 MERGE SQL Command following SQL:2016
Author: Pavan Deolasee
Reviewed-by: Michael Paquier
MERGE performs actions that modify rows in the target table
using a source table or query. MERGE provides a single SQL
statement that can conditionally INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE rows
a task that would other require multiple PL statements.
e.g.
MERGE INTO target AS t
USING source AS s
ON t.tid = s.sid
WHEN MATCHED AND t.balance > s.delta THEN
UPDATE SET balance = t.balance - s.delta
WHEN MATCHED THEN
DELETE
WHEN NOT MATCHED AND s.delta > 0 THEN
INSERT VALUES (s.sid, s.delta)
WHEN NOT MATCHED THEN
DO NOTHING;
MERGE works with regular and partitioned tables, including
column and row security enforcement, as well as support for
row, statement and transition triggers.
MERGE is optimized for OLTP and is parameterizable, though
also useful for large scale ETL/ELT. MERGE is not intended
to be used in preference to existing single SQL commands
for INSERT, UPDATE or DELETE since there is some overhead.
MERGE can be used statically from PL/pgSQL.
MERGE does not yet support inheritance, write rules,
RETURNING clauses, updatable views or foreign tables.
MERGE follows SQL Standard per the most recent SQL:2016.
Includes full tests and documentation, including full
isolation tests to demonstrate the concurrent behavior.
This version written from scratch in 2017 by Simon Riggs,
using docs and tests originally written in 2009. Later work
from Pavan Deolasee has been both complex and deep, leaving
the lead author credit now in his hands.
Extensive discussion of concurrency from Peter Geoghegan,
with thanks for the time and effort contributed.
Various issues reported via sqlsmith by Andreas Seltenreich
Authors: Pavan Deolasee, Simon Riggs
Reviewer: Peter Geoghegan, Amit Langote, Tomas Vondra, Simon Riggs
Discussion:
https://postgr.es/m/CANP8+jKitBSrB7oTgT9CY2i1ObfOt36z0XMraQc+Xrz8QB0nXA@mail.gmail.comhttps://postgr.es/m/CAH2-WzkJdBuxj9PO=2QaO9-3h3xGbQPZ34kJH=HukRekwM-GZg@mail.gmail.com
The changes in the CREATE POLICY man page from commit
87c2a17fee triggered a stylesheet bug that
created some warning messages and incorrect output. This installs a
workaround.
Also improve the whitespace a bit so it looks better.
Since some preparation work had already been done, the only source
changes left were changing empty-element tags like <xref linkend="foo">
to <xref linkend="foo"/>, and changing the DOCTYPE.
The source files are still named *.sgml, but they are actually XML files
now. Renaming could be considered later.
In the build system, the intermediate step to convert from SGML to XML
is removed. Everything is build straight from the source files again.
The OpenSP (or the old SP) package is no longer needed.
The documentation toolchain instructions are updated and are much
simpler now.
Peter Eisentraut, Alexander Lakhin, Jürgen Purtz
IDs in SGML are case insensitive, and we have accumulated a mix of upper
and lower case IDs, including different variants of the same ID. In
XML, these will be case sensitive, so we need to fix up those
differences. Going to all lower case seems most straightforward, and
the current build process already makes all anchors and lower case
anyway during the SGML->XML conversion, so this doesn't create any
difference in the output right now. A future XML-only build process
would, however, maintain any mixed case ID spellings in the output, so
that is another reason to clean this up beforehand.
Author: Alexander Lakhin <exclusion@gmail.com>
For DocBook XML compatibility, don't use SGML empty tags (</>) anymore,
replace by the full tag name. Add a warning option to catch future
occurrences.
Alexander Lakhin, Jürgen Purtz
We have had support for restrictive RLS policies since 9.5, but they
were only available through extensions which use the appropriate hooks.
This adds support into the grammer, catalog, psql and pg_dump for
restrictive RLS policies, thus reducing the cases where an extension is
necessary.
In passing, also move away from using "AND"d and "OR"d in comments.
As pointed out by Alvaro, it's not really appropriate to attempt
to make verbs out of "AND" and "OR", so reword those comments which
attempted to.
Reviewed By: Jeevan Chalke, Dean Rasheed
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20160901063404.GY4028@tamriel.snowman.net
Commit 43cd468cf0 added some wording to create_policy.sgml purporting
to warn users against a race condition of the sort that had been noted some
time ago by Peter Geoghegan. However, that warning was far too vague to be
useful (or at least, I completely failed to grasp what it was on about).
Since the problem case occurs with a security design pattern that lots of
people are likely to try to use, we need to be as clear as possible about
it. Provide a concrete example in the main-line docs in place of the
original warning.
Clarify that SELECT policies are now applied when SELECT rights
are required for a given query, even if the query is an UPDATE or
DELETE query. Pointed out by Noah.
Additionally, note the risk regarding concurrently open transactions
where a relation which controls access to the rows of another relation
are updated and the rows of the primary relation are also being
modified. Pointed out by Peter Geoghegan.
Back-patch to 9.5.
The newly added ON CONFLICT clause allows to specify an alternative to
raising a unique or exclusion constraint violation error when inserting.
ON CONFLICT refers to constraints that can either be specified using a
inference clause (by specifying the columns of a unique constraint) or
by naming a unique or exclusion constraint. DO NOTHING avoids the
constraint violation, without touching the pre-existing row. DO UPDATE
SET ... [WHERE ...] updates the pre-existing tuple, and has access to
both the tuple proposed for insertion and the existing tuple; the
optional WHERE clause can be used to prevent an update from being
executed. The UPDATE SET and WHERE clauses have access to the tuple
proposed for insertion using the "magic" EXCLUDED alias, and to the
pre-existing tuple using the table name or its alias.
This feature is often referred to as upsert.
This is implemented using a new infrastructure called "speculative
insertion". It is an optimistic variant of regular insertion that first
does a pre-check for existing tuples and then attempts an insert. If a
violating tuple was inserted concurrently, the speculatively inserted
tuple is deleted and a new attempt is made. If the pre-check finds a
matching tuple the alternative DO NOTHING or DO UPDATE action is taken.
If the insertion succeeds without detecting a conflict, the tuple is
deemed inserted.
To handle the possible ambiguity between the excluded alias and a table
named excluded, and for convenience with long relation names, INSERT
INTO now can alias its target table.
Bumps catversion as stored rules change.
Author: Peter Geoghegan, with significant contributions from Heikki
Linnakangas and Andres Freund. Testing infrastructure by Jeff Janes.
Reviewed-By: Heikki Linnakangas, Andres Freund, Robert Haas, Simon Riggs,
Dean Rasheed, Stephen Frost and many others.
In commit 31eae6028e, some documents were not updated to show the new
capability; fix that. Also, the error message you get when CURRENT_USER
and SESSION_USER are used in a context that doesn't accept them could be
clearer about it being a problem only in those contexts; so add the
word "here".
Author: Kyotaro HORIGUCHI
His patch submission also included changes to GRANT/REVOKE, but those
seemed more controversial, so I left them out. We can reconsider these
changes later.
The RLS capability is built on top of the WITH CHECK OPTION
system which was added for auto-updatable views, however, unlike
WCOs on views (which are mandated by the SQL spec to not fire until
after all other constraints and checks are done), it makes much more
sense for RLS checks to happen earlier than constraint and uniqueness
checks.
This patch reworks the structure which holds the WCOs a bit to be
explicitly either VIEW or RLS checks and the RLS-related checks are
done prior to the constraint and uniqueness checks. This also allows
better error reporting as we are now reporting when a violation is due
to a WITH CHECK OPTION and when it's due to an RLS policy violation,
which was independently noted by Craig Ringer as being confusing.
The documentation is also updated to include a paragraph about when RLS
WITH CHECK handling is performed, as there have been a number of
questions regarding that and the documentation was previously silent on
the matter.
Author: Dean Rasheed, with some kabitzing and comment changes by me.
In ALTER POLICY, use 'check_expression' instead of 'expression' for the
parameter, to match up with the recent CREATE POLICY change.
In CREATE POLICY, frame the discussion as granting access to rows
instead of limiting access to rows. Further, clarify that the
expression must return true for rows to be visible/allowed and that a
false or NULL result will mean the row is not visible/allowed.
Per discussion with Dean Rasheed and Robert.
The parameter description for the using_expression and check_expression
in CREATE POLICY were unclear and arguably included a typo. Clarify
and improve the consistency of that language.
Pointed out by Dean Rasheed.
The syntax for CREATE POLICY simply used "expression" for the USING
expression, while the WITH CHECK expression was "check_expression".
Given that we have two expressions, it's sensible to explcitly name both
to maintain clarity.
This patch simply changes the generic "expression" to be
"using_expression".
Pointed out by Peter Geoghegan.
The CREATE POLICY documention didn't sufficiently clarify what happens
when a given command type (eg: ALL or UPDATE) accepts both USING and
WITH CHECK clauses, but only the USING clause is defined. Add language
to clarify that, in such a case, the USING clause will be used for both
USING and WITH CHECK cases.
Pointed out by Peter Geoghegan.
As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity
pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This
patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to
match the new catalog name.
The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also
pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and
re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY
processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we
finish planning out the query which has been built.
Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries
for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various
places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the
ability to COMMENT on policies.
In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments,
and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of
'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor
of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate.
Happy Thanksgiving!
Andres pointed out that there was an extra ';' in equalPolicies, which
made me realize that my prior testing with CLOBBER_CACHE_ALWAYS was
insufficient (it didn't always catch the issue, just most of the time).
Thanks to that, a different issue was discovered, specifically in
equalRSDescs. This change corrects eqaulRSDescs to return 'true' once
all policies have been confirmed logically identical. After stepping
through both functions to ensure correct behavior, I ran this for
about 12 hours of CLOBBER_CACHE_ALWAYS runs of the regression tests
with no failures.
In addition, correct a few typos in the documentation which were pointed
out by Thom Brown (thanks!) and improve the policy documentation further
by adding a flushed out usage example based on a unix passwd file.
Lastly, clean up a few comments in the regression tests and pg_dump.h.
Buildfarm member tick identified an issue where the policies in the
relcache for a relation were were being replaced underneath a running
query, leading to segfaults while processing the policies to be added
to a query. Similar to how TupleDesc RuleLocks are handled, add in a
equalRSDesc() function to check if the policies have actually changed
and, if not, swap back the rsdesc field (using the original instead of
the temporairly built one; the whole structure is swapped and then
specific fields swapped back). This now passes a CLOBBER_CACHE_ALWAYS
for me and should resolve the buildfarm error.
In addition to addressing this, add a new chapter in Data Definition
under Privileges which explains row security and provides examples of
its usage, change \d to always list policies (even if row security is
disabled- but note that it is disabled, or enabled with no policies),
rework check_role_for_policy (it really didn't need the entire policy,
but it did need to be using has_privs_of_role()), and change the field
in pg_class to relrowsecurity from relhasrowsecurity, based on
Heikki's suggestion. Also from Heikki, only issue SET ROW_SECURITY in
pg_restore when talking to a 9.5+ server, list Bypass RLS in \du, and
document --enable-row-security options for pg_dump and pg_restore.
Lastly, fix a number of minor whitespace and typo issues from Heikki,
Dimitri, add a missing #include, per Peter E, fix a few minor
variable-assigned-but-not-used and resource leak issues from Coverity
and add tab completion for role attribute bypassrls as well.
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
