This is exactly the same problem as commit 1b242f42b fixed in ecpg,
but in contrib/pgcrypto. Commit 273c458a2 eliminated the problem
here for v10 and up. We hadn't noticed for exactly the same reasons
enumerated in bbbf22cf3.
Back-patch down to 9.2, pursuant to newly-established project policy
about keeping out-of-support branches buildable.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/d0316012-ece7-7b7e-2d36-9c38cb77cb3b@enterprisedb.com
Recent versions of gcc whine about the admittedly-completely-illegible
formatting of this macro. We've not noticed for a few reasons:
* In v12 and up, the problem is gone thanks to 48e24ba6b.
(Back-patching that doesn't seem prudent, though, so this patch
just manually improves the macro's formatting.)
* Buildfarm animals that might have complained, such as caiman,
do not because they use --with-openssl and so don't build imath.c.
* In a manual run such as "make all check-world", you won't see the
warning because it gets buried in an install.log file. You have to
do "make -C contrib all" or the like to see it.
I noticed this because in older branches, the last bit doesn't
happen so "check-world" actually does spew the warnings to stderr.
Maybe we should rethink how that works, because the newer behavior
is not an improvement IMO.
Back-patch down to 9.2, pursuant to newly-established project policy
about keeping out-of-support branches buildable.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/d0316012-ece7-7b7e-2d36-9c38cb77cb3b@enterprisedb.com
The following routines are called within pgcrypto when handling digests
but there were no checks for failures:
- EVP_MD_CTX_size (can fail with -1 as of 3.0.0)
- EVP_MD_CTX_block_size (can fail with -1 as of 3.0.0)
- EVP_DigestInit_ex
- EVP_DigestUpdate
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex
A set of elog(ERROR) is added by this commit to detect such failures,
that should never happen except in the event of a processing failure
internal to OpenSSL.
Note that it would be possible to use ERR_reason_error_string() to get
more context about such errors, but these refer mainly to the internals
of OpenSSL, so it is not really obvious how useful that would be. This
is left out for simplicity.
Per report from Coverity. Thanks to Tom Lane for the discussion.
Backpatch-through: 9.5
When allocating a EVP context, it would have been possible to leak some
memory allocated directly by OpenSSL, that PostgreSQL lost track of if
the initialization of the context allocated failed. The cleanup can be
done with EVP_MD_CTX_destroy().
Note that EVP APIs exist since OpenSSL 0.9.7 and we have in the tree
equivalent implementations for older versions since ce9b75d (code
removed with 9b7cd59a as of 10~). However, in 9.5 and 9.6, the existing
code makes use of EVP_MD_CTX_destroy() and EVP_MD_CTX_create() without
an equivalent implementation when building the tree with OpenSSL 0.9.6
or older, meaning that this code is in reality broken with such versions
since it got introduced in e2838c5. As we have heard no complains about
that, it does not seem worth bothering with in 9.5 and 9.6, so I have
left that out for simplicity.
Author: Michael Paquier
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20201015072212.GC2305@paquier.xyz
Backpatch-through: 9.5
In theory, the second px_find_digest call in px_crypt_md5 could fail
even though the first one succeeded, since resource allocation is
required. Don't skip testing for a failure. (If one did happen,
the likely result would be a crash rather than clean recovery from
an OOM failure.)
The code's been like this all along, so back-patch to all supported
branches.
Daniel Gustafsson
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/AA8D6FE9-4AB2-41B4-98CB-AE64BA668C03@yesql.se
A compressed stream may end with an empty packet. In this case
decompression finishes before reading the empty packet and the
remaining stream packet causes a failure in reading the following
data. This commit makes sure to consume such extra data, avoiding a
failure when decompression the data. This corner case was reproducible
easily with a data length of 16kB, and existed since e94dd6a. A cheap
regression test is added to cover this case based on a random,
incompressible string.
The first attempt of this patch has allowed to find an older failure
within the compression logic of pgcrypto, fixed by b9b6105. This
involved SLES 15 with z390 where a custom flavor of libz gets used.
Bonus thanks to Mark Wong for providing access to the specific
environment.
Reported-by: Frank Gagnepain
Author: Kyotaro Horiguchi, Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Tom Lane
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/16476-692ef7b84e5fb893@postgresql.org
Backpatch-through: 9.5
contrib/pgcrypto mishandled the case where deflate() does not consume
all of the offered input on the first try. It reset the next_in pointer
to the start of the input instead of leaving it alone, causing the wrong
data to be fed to the next deflate() call.
This has been broken since pgcrypto was committed. The reason for the
lack of complaints seems to be that it's fairly hard to get stock zlib
to not consume all the input, so long as the output buffer is big enough
(which it normally would be in pgcrypto's usage; AFAICT the input is
always going to be packetized into packets no larger than ZIP_OUT_BUF).
However, IBM's zlibNX implementation for AIX evidently will do it
in some cases.
I did not add a test case for this, because I couldn't find one that
would fail with stock zlib. When we put back the test case for
bug #16476, that will cover the zlibNX situation well enough.
While here, write deflate()'s second argument as Z_NO_FLUSH per its
API spec, instead of hard-wiring the value zero.
Per buildfarm results and subsequent investigation.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/16476-692ef7b84e5fb893@postgresql.org
This reverts commit 9e10898, after finding out that buildfarm members
running SLES 15 on z390 complain on the compression and decompression
logic of the new test: pipistrelles, barbthroat and steamerduck.
Those hosts are visibly using hardware-specific changes to improve zlib
performance, requiring more investigation.
Thanks to Tom Lane for the discussion.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20200722093749.GA2564@paquier.xyz
Backpatch-through: 9.5
A compressed stream may end with an empty packet, and PGP decompression
finished before reading this empty packet in the remaining stream. This
caused a failure in pgcrypto, handling this case as corrupted data.
This commit makes sure to consume such extra data, avoiding a failure
when decompression the entire stream. This corner case was reproducible
with a data length of 16kB, and existed since its introduction in
e94dd6a. A cheap regression test is added to cover this case.
Thanks to Jeff Janes for the extra investigation.
Reported-by: Frank Gagnepain
Author: Kyotaro Horiguchi, Michael Paquier
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/16476-692ef7b84e5fb893@postgresql.org
Backpatch-through: 9.5
Writing a trailing semicolon in a macro is almost never the right thing,
because you almost always want to write a semicolon after each macro
call instead. (Even if there was some reason to prefer not to, pgindent
would probably make a hash of code formatted that way; so within PG the
rule should basically be "don't do it".) Thus, if we have a semi inside
the macro, the compiler sees "something;;". Much of the time the extra
empty statement is harmless, but it could lead to mysterious syntax
errors at call sites. In perhaps an overabundance of neatnik-ism, let's
run around and get rid of the excess semicolons whereever possible.
The only thing worse than a mysterious syntax error is a mysterious
syntax error that only happens in the back branches; therefore,
backpatch these changes where relevant, which is most of them because
most of these mistakes are old. (The lack of reported problems shows
that this is largely a hypothetical issue, but still, it could bite
us in some future patch.)
John Naylor and Tom Lane
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CACPNZCs0qWTqJ2QUSGJ07B7uvAvzMb-KbG2q+oo+J3tsWN5cqw@mail.gmail.com
Historically we forbade datatype-specific comparison functions from
returning INT_MIN, so that it would be safe to invert the sort order
just by negating the comparison result. However, this was never
really safe for comparison functions that directly return the result
of memcmp(), strcmp(), etc, as POSIX doesn't place any such restriction
on those library functions. Buildfarm results show that at least on
recent Linux on s390x, memcmp() actually does return INT_MIN sometimes,
causing sort failures.
The agreed-on answer is to remove this restriction and fix relevant
call sites to not make such an assumption; code such as "res = -res"
should be replaced by "INVERT_COMPARE_RESULT(res)". The same is needed
in a few places that just directly negated the result of memcmp or
strcmp.
To help find places having this problem, I've also added a compile option
to nbtcompare.c that causes some of the commonly used comparators to
return INT_MIN/INT_MAX instead of their usual -1/+1. It'd likely be
a good idea to have at least one buildfarm member running with
"-DSTRESS_SORT_INT_MIN". That's far from a complete test of course,
but it should help to prevent fresh introductions of such bugs.
This is a longstanding portability hazard, so back-patch to all supported
branches.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20180928185215.ffoq2xrq5d3pafna@alap3.anarazel.de
Solaris 11.4 has built-in functions named b64_encode and b64_decode.
Rename ours to something else to avoid the conflict (fortunately,
ours are static so the impact is limited).
One could wish for less duplication of code in this area, but that
would be a larger patch and not very suitable for back-patching.
Since this is a portability fix, we want to put it into all supported
branches.
Report and initial patch by Rainer Orth, reviewed and adjusted a bit
by Michael Paquier
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/ydd372wk28h.fsf@CeBiTec.Uni-Bielefeld.DE
LibreSSL defines OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER to claim that it is version 2.0.0,
but it doesn't have the functions added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. Add autoconf
checks for the individual functions we need, and stop relying on
OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER.
Backport to 9.5 and 9.6, like the patch that broke this. In the
back-branches, there are still a few OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER checks left,
to check for OpenSSL 0.9.8 or 0.9.7. I left them as they were - LibreSSL
has all those functions, so they work as intended.
Per buildfarm member curculio.
Discussion: <2442.1473957669@sss.pgh.pa.us>
Changes needed to build at all:
- Check for SSL_new in configure, now that SSL_library_init is a macro.
- Do not access struct members directly. This includes some new code in
pgcrypto, to use the resource owner mechanism to ensure that we don't
leak OpenSSL handles, now that we can't embed them in other structs
anymore.
- RAND_SSLeay() -> RAND_OpenSSL()
Changes that were needed to silence deprecation warnings, but were not
strictly necessary:
- RAND_pseudo_bytes() -> RAND_bytes().
- SSL_library_init() and OpenSSL_config() -> OPENSSL_init_ssl()
- ASN1_STRING_data() -> ASN1_STRING_get0_data()
- DH_generate_parameters() -> DH_generate_parameters()
- Locking callbacks are not needed with OpenSSL 1.1.0 anymore. (Good
riddance!)
Also change references to SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER with OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER,
for the sake of consistency. OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER has existed since time
immemorial.
Fix SSL test suite to work with OpenSSL 1.1.0. CA certificates must have
the "CA:true" basic constraint extension now, or OpenSSL will refuse them.
Regenerate the test certificates with that. The "openssl" binary, used to
generate the certificates, is also now more picky, and throws an error
if an X509 extension is specified in "req_extensions", but that section
is empty.
Backpatch to 9.5 and 9.6, per popular demand. The file structure was
somewhat different in earlier branches, so I didn't bother to go further
than that. In back-branches, we still support OpenSSL 0.9.7 and above.
OpenSSL 0.9.6 should still work too, but I didn't test it. In master, we
only support 0.9.8 and above.
Patch by Andreas Karlsson, with additional changes by me.
Discussion: <20160627151604.GD1051@msg.df7cb.de>
Both Blowfish and DES implementations of crypt() can take arbitrarily
long time, depending on the number of rounds specified by the caller;
make sure they can be interrupted.
Author: Andreas Karlsson
Reviewer: Jeff Janes
Backpatch to 9.1.
Certain short salts crashed the backend or disclosed a few bytes of
backend memory. For existing salt-induced error conditions, emit a
message saying as much. Back-patch to 9.0 (all supported versions).
Josh Kupershmidt
Security: CVE-2015-5288
This has been the predominant outcome. When the output of decrypting
with a wrong key coincidentally resembled an OpenPGP packet header,
pgcrypto could instead report "Corrupt data", "Not text data" or
"Unsupported compression algorithm". The distinct "Corrupt data"
message added no value. The latter two error messages misled when the
decrypted payload also exhibited fundamental integrity problems. Worse,
error message variance in other systems has enabled cryptologic attacks;
see RFC 4880 section "14. Security Considerations". Whether these
pgcrypto behaviors are likewise exploitable is unknown.
In passing, document that pgcrypto does not resist side-channel attacks.
Back-patch to 9.0 (all supported versions).
Security: CVE-2015-3167
This improves on commit bbfd7edae5 by
making two simple changes:
* pg_attribute_noreturn now takes parentheses, ie pg_attribute_noreturn().
Likewise pg_attribute_unused(), pg_attribute_packed(). This reduces
pgindent's tendency to misformat declarations involving them.
* attributes are now always attached to function declarations, not
definitions. Previously some places were taking creative shortcuts,
which were not merely candidates for bad misformatting by pgindent
but often were outright wrong anyway. (It does little good to put a
noreturn annotation where callers can't see it.) In any case, if
we would like to believe that these macros can be used with non-gcc
compilers, we should avoid gratuitous variance in usage patterns.
I also went through and manually improved the formatting of a lot of
declarations, and got rid of excessively repetitive (and now obsolete
anyway) comments informing the reader what pg_attribute_printf is for.
Until now __attribute__() was defined to be empty for all compilers but
gcc. That's problematic because it prevents using it in other compilers;
which is necessary e.g. for atomics portability. It's also just
generally dubious to do so in a header as widely included as c.h.
Instead add pg_attribute_format_arg, pg_attribute_printf,
pg_attribute_noreturn macros which are implemented in the compilers that
understand them. Also add pg_attribute_noreturn and pg_attribute_packed,
but don't provide fallbacks, since they can affect functionality.
This means that external code that, possibly unwittingly, relied on
__attribute__ defined to be empty on !gcc compilers may now run into
warnings or errors on those compilers. But there shouldn't be many
occurances of that and it's hard to work around...
Discussion: 54B58BA3.8040302@ohmu.fi
Author: Oskari Saarenmaa, with some minor changes by me.
This function uses uninitialized stack and heap buffers as supplementary
entropy sources. Mark them so Memcheck will not complain. Back-patch
to 9.4, where Valgrind Memcheck cooperation first appeared.
Marko Tiikkaja
This covers alterations to buffer sizing and zeroing made between imath
1.3 and imath 1.20. Valgrind Memcheck identified the buffer overruns
and reliance on uninitialized data; their exploit potential is unknown.
Builds specifying --with-openssl are unaffected, because they use the
OpenSSL BIGNUM facility instead of imath. Back-patch to 9.0 (all
supported versions).
Security: CVE-2015-0243
Most callers pass a stack buffer. The ensuing stack smash can crash the
server, and we have not ruled out the viability of attacks that lead to
privilege escalation. Back-patch to 9.0 (all supported versions).
Marko Tiikkaja
Security: CVE-2015-0243
Coverity points out that mdc_finish returns a pointer to a local buffer
(which of course is gone as soon as the function returns), leaving open
a risk of misbehaviors possibly as bad as a stack overwrite.
In reality, the only possible call site is in process_data_packets()
which does not examine the returned pointer at all. So there's no
live bug, but nonetheless the code is confusing and risky. Refactor
to avoid the issue by letting process_data_packets() call mdc_finish()
directly instead of going through the pullf_read() API.
Although this is only cosmetic, it seems good to back-patch so that
the logic in pgp-decrypt.c stays in sync across all branches.
Marko Kreen
strncpy() has a well-deserved reputation for being unsafe, so make an
effort to get rid of nearly all occurrences in HEAD.
A large fraction of the remaining uses were passing length less than or
equal to the known strlen() of the source, in which case no null-padding
can occur and the behavior is equivalent to memcpy(), though doubtless
slower and certainly harder to reason about. So just use memcpy() in
these cases.
In other cases, use either StrNCpy() or strlcpy() as appropriate (depending
on whether padding to the full length of the destination buffer seems
useful).
I left a few strncpy() calls alone in the src/timezone/ code, to keep it
in sync with upstream (the IANA tzcode distribution). There are also a
few such calls in ecpg that could possibly do with more analysis.
AFAICT, none of these changes are more than cosmetic, except for the four
occurrences in fe-secure-openssl.c, which are in fact buggy: an overlength
source leads to a non-null-terminated destination buffer and ensuing
misbehavior. These don't seem like security issues, first because no stack
clobber is possible and second because if your values of sslcert etc are
coming from untrusted sources then you've got problems way worse than this.
Still, it's undesirable to have unpredictable behavior for overlength
inputs, so back-patch those four changes to all active branches.
This fixes a scenario in which pgp_sym_decrypt() failed with "Wrong key
or corrupt data" on messages whose length is 6 less than a power of 2.
Per bug #11905 from Connor Penhale. Fix by Marko Tiikkaja, regression
test case from Jeff Janes.
pgp_sym_encrypt's option is spelled "sess-key", not "enable-session-key".
Spotted by Jeff Janes.
In passing, improve a comment in pgp-pgsql.c to make it clearer that
the debugging options are intentionally undocumented.
This add a new pgp_armor_headers function to extract armor headers from an
ASCII-armored blob, and a new overloaded variant of the armor function, for
constructing an ASCII-armor with extra headers.
Marko Tiikkaja and me.
Instead of trying to accurately calculate the space needed, use a StringInfo
that's enlarged as needed. This is just moving things around currently - the
old code was not wrong - but this is in preparation for a patch that adds
support for extra armor headers, and would make the space calculation more
complicated.
Marko Tiikkaja
Some of the many error messages introduced in 458857cc missed 'FROM
unpackaged'. Also e016b724 and 45ffeb7e forgot to quote extension
version numbers.
Backpatch to 9.1, just like 458857cc which introduced the messages. Do
so because the error messages thrown when the wrong command is copy &
pasted aren't easy to understand.
ws2_32 is the new version of the library that should be used, as
it contains the require functionality from wsock32 as well as some
more (which is why some binaries were already using ws2_32).
Michael Paquier, reviewed by MauMau
Prominent binaries already had this metadata. A handful of minor
binaries, such as pg_regress.exe, still lack it; efforts to eliminate
such exceptions are welcome.
Michael Paquier, reviewed by MauMau.
Because of gcc -Wmissing-prototypes, all functions in dynamically
loadable modules must have a separate prototype declaration. This is
meant to detect global functions that are not declared in header files,
but in cases where the function is called via dfmgr, this is redundant.
Besides filling up space with boilerplate, this is a frequent source of
compiler warnings in extension modules.
We can fix that by creating the function prototype as part of the
PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1 macro, which such modules have to use anyway. That
makes the code of modules cleaner, because there is one less place where
the entry points have to be listed, and creates an additional check that
functions have the right prototype.
Remove now redundant prototypes from contrib and other modules.
Specifically, on-stack memset() might be removed, so:
* Replace memset() with px_memset()
* Add px_memset to copy_crlf()
* Add px_memset to pgp-s2k.c
Patch by Marko Kreen
Report by PVS-Studio
Backpatch through 8.4.
This function provides a way of generating version 4 (pseudorandom) UUIDs
based on pgcrypto's PRNG. The main reason for doing this is that the
OSSP UUID library depended on by contrib/uuid-ossp is becoming more and
more of a porting headache, so we need an alternative for people who can't
install that. A nice side benefit though is that this implementation is
noticeably faster than uuid-ossp's uuid_generate_v4() function.
Oskari Saarenmaa, reviewed by Emre Hasegeli
pgp.h used to require including mbuf.h and px.h first. Include those in
pgp.h, so that it can be used without prerequisites. Remove mbuf.h
inclusions in .c files where mbuf.h features are not used
directly. (px.h was always used.)
Overly tight coding caused the password transformation loop to stop
examining input once it had processed a byte equal to 0x80. Thus, if the
given password string contained such a byte (which is possible though not
highly likely in UTF8, and perhaps also in other non-ASCII encodings), all
subsequent characters would not contribute to the hash, making the password
much weaker than it appears on the surface.
This would only affect cases where applications used DES crypt() to encode
passwords before storing them in the database. If a weak password has been
created in this fashion, the hash will stop matching after this update has
been applied, so it will be easy to tell if any passwords were unexpectedly
weak. Changing to a different password would be a good idea in such a case.
(Since DES has been considered inadequately secure for some time, changing
to a different encryption algorithm can also be recommended.)
This code, and the bug, are shared with at least PHP, FreeBSD, and OpenBSD.
Since the other projects have already published their fixes, there is no
point in trying to keep this commit private.
This bug has been assigned CVE-2012-2143, and credit for its discovery goes
to Rubin Xu and Joseph Bonneau.
