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Obstruct shell, SQL, and conninfo injection via database and role names.

Due to simplistic quoting and confusion of database names with conninfo
strings, roles with the CREATEDB or CREATEROLE option could escalate to
superuser privileges when a superuser next ran certain maintenance
commands.  The new coding rule for PQconnectdbParams() calls, documented
at conninfo_array_parse(), is to pass expand_dbname=true and wrap
literal database names in a trivial connection string.  Escape
zero-length values in appendConnStrVal().  Back-patch to 9.1 (all
supported versions).

Nathan Bossart, Michael Paquier, and Noah Misch.  Reviewed by Peter
Eisentraut.  Reported by Nathan Bossart.

Security: CVE-2016-5424
This commit is contained in:
Noah Misch
2016-08-08 10:07:46 -04:00
parent 41f18f021a
commit fcd15f1358
20 changed files with 315 additions and 67 deletions

View File

@ -4423,7 +4423,11 @@ conninfo_parse(const char *conninfo, PQExpBuffer errorMessage,
* of "dbname" keyword is a connection string (as indicated by
* recognized_connection_string) then parse and process it, overriding any
* previously processed conflicting keywords. Subsequent keywords will take
* precedence, however.
* precedence, however. In-tree programs generally specify expand_dbname=true,
* so command-line arguments naming a database can use a connection string.
* Some code acquires arbitrary database names from known-literal sources like
* PQdb(), PQconninfoParse() and pg_database.datname. When connecting to such
* a database, in-tree code first wraps the name in a connection string.
*/
static PQconninfoOption *
conninfo_array_parse(const char *const * keywords, const char *const * values,