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Misc SCRAM code cleanups.

* Move computation of SaltedPassword to a separate function from
  scram_ClientOrServerKey(). This saves a lot of cycles in libpq, by
  computing SaltedPassword only once per authentication. (Computing
  SaltedPassword is expensive by design.)

* Split scram_ClientOrServerKey() into two functions. Improves
  readability, by making the calling code less verbose.

* Rename "server proof" to "server signature", to better match the
  nomenclature used in RFC 5802.

* Rename SCRAM_SALT_LEN to SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN, to make it more clear
  that the salt can be of any length, and the constant only specifies how
  long a salt we use when we generate a new verifier. Also rename
  SCRAM_ITERATIONS_DEFAULT to SCRAM_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS, for consistency.

These things caught my eye while working on other upcoming changes.
This commit is contained in:
Heikki Linnakangas
2017-04-28 15:04:02 +03:00
parent b9a3ef55b2
commit d981074c24
4 changed files with 89 additions and 71 deletions

View File

@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ typedef struct
char *password;
/* We construct these */
uint8 SaltedPassword[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
char *client_nonce;
char *client_first_message_bare;
char *client_final_message_without_proof;
@ -59,7 +60,7 @@ typedef struct
/* These come from the server-final message */
char *server_final_message;
char ServerProof[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
char ServerSignature[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
} fe_scram_state;
static bool read_server_first_message(fe_scram_state *state, char *input,
@ -70,7 +71,7 @@ static char *build_client_first_message(fe_scram_state *state,
PQExpBuffer errormessage);
static char *build_client_final_message(fe_scram_state *state,
PQExpBuffer errormessage);
static bool verify_server_proof(fe_scram_state *state);
static bool verify_server_signature(fe_scram_state *state);
static void calculate_client_proof(fe_scram_state *state,
const char *client_final_message_without_proof,
uint8 *result);
@ -216,12 +217,12 @@ pg_fe_scram_exchange(void *opaq, char *input, int inputlen,
goto error;
/*
* Verify server proof, to make sure we're talking to the genuine
* server. XXX: A fake server could simply not require
* Verify server signature, to make sure we're talking to the
* genuine server. XXX: A fake server could simply not require
* authentication, though. There is currently no option in libpq
* to reject a connection, if SCRAM authentication did not happen.
*/
if (verify_server_proof(state))
if (verify_server_signature(state))
*success = true;
else
{
@ -486,12 +487,11 @@ read_server_first_message(fe_scram_state *state, char *input,
* Read the final exchange message coming from the server.
*/
static bool
read_server_final_message(fe_scram_state *state,
char *input,
read_server_final_message(fe_scram_state *state, char *input,
PQExpBuffer errormessage)
{
char *encoded_server_proof;
int server_proof_len;
char *encoded_server_signature;
int server_signature_len;
state->server_final_message = strdup(input);
if (!state->server_final_message)
@ -513,8 +513,8 @@ read_server_final_message(fe_scram_state *state,
}
/* Parse the message. */
encoded_server_proof = read_attr_value(&input, 'v', errormessage);
if (encoded_server_proof == NULL)
encoded_server_signature = read_attr_value(&input, 'v', errormessage);
if (encoded_server_signature == NULL)
{
/* read_attr_value() has generated an error message */
return false;
@ -524,13 +524,13 @@ read_server_final_message(fe_scram_state *state,
printfPQExpBuffer(errormessage,
libpq_gettext("malformed SCRAM message (garbage at end of server-final-message)\n"));
server_proof_len = pg_b64_decode(encoded_server_proof,
strlen(encoded_server_proof),
state->ServerProof);
if (server_proof_len != SCRAM_KEY_LEN)
server_signature_len = pg_b64_decode(encoded_server_signature,
strlen(encoded_server_signature),
state->ServerSignature);
if (server_signature_len != SCRAM_KEY_LEN)
{
printfPQExpBuffer(errormessage,
libpq_gettext("malformed SCRAM message (invalid server proof)\n"));
libpq_gettext("malformed SCRAM message (invalid server signature)\n"));
return false;
}
@ -552,8 +552,14 @@ calculate_client_proof(fe_scram_state *state,
int i;
scram_HMAC_ctx ctx;
scram_ClientOrServerKey(state->password, state->salt, state->saltlen,
state->iterations, SCRAM_CLIENT_KEY_NAME, ClientKey);
/*
* Calculate SaltedPassword, and store it in 'state' so that we can reuse
* it later in verify_server_signature.
*/
scram_SaltedPassword(state->password, state->salt, state->saltlen,
state->iterations, state->SaltedPassword);
scram_ClientKey(state->SaltedPassword, ClientKey);
scram_H(ClientKey, SCRAM_KEY_LEN, StoredKey);
scram_HMAC_init(&ctx, StoredKey, SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
@ -575,19 +581,17 @@ calculate_client_proof(fe_scram_state *state,
}
/*
* Validate the server proof, received as part of the final exchange message
* received from the server.
* Validate the server signature, received as part of the final exchange
* message received from the server.
*/
static bool
verify_server_proof(fe_scram_state *state)
verify_server_signature(fe_scram_state *state)
{
uint8 ServerSignature[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
uint8 expected_ServerSignature[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
uint8 ServerKey[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
scram_HMAC_ctx ctx;
scram_ClientOrServerKey(state->password, state->salt, state->saltlen,
state->iterations, SCRAM_SERVER_KEY_NAME,
ServerKey);
scram_ServerKey(state->SaltedPassword, ServerKey);
/* calculate ServerSignature */
scram_HMAC_init(&ctx, ServerKey, SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
@ -602,9 +606,9 @@ verify_server_proof(fe_scram_state *state)
scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
state->client_final_message_without_proof,
strlen(state->client_final_message_without_proof));
scram_HMAC_final(ServerSignature, &ctx);
scram_HMAC_final(expected_ServerSignature, &ctx);
if (memcmp(ServerSignature, state->ServerProof, SCRAM_KEY_LEN) != 0)
if (memcmp(expected_ServerSignature, state->ServerSignature, SCRAM_KEY_LEN) != 0)
return false;
return true;