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@ -1,709 +0,0 @@
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pgcrypto - cryptographic functions for PostgreSQL
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=================================================
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Marko Kreen <markokr@gmail.com>
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// Note: this document is in asciidoc format.
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1. Installation
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||||
-----------------
|
||||
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||||
Run following commands:
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||||
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||||
make
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||||
make install
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||||
make installcheck
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||||
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The `make installcheck` command is important. It runs regression tests
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||||
for the module. They make sure the functions here produce correct
|
||||
results.
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||||
|
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Next, to put the functions into a particular database, run the commands in
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file pgcrypto.sql, which has been installed into the shared files directory.
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Example using psql:
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psql -d DBNAME -f pgcrypto.sql
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2. Notes
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----------
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2.1. Configuration
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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pgcrypto configures itself according to the findings of main PostgreSQL
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`configure` script. The options that affect it are `--with-zlib` and
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`--with-openssl`.
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When compiled with zlib, PGP encryption functions are able to
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compress data before encrypting.
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When compiled with OpenSSL there will be more algorithms available.
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Also public-key encryption functions will be faster as OpenSSL
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has more optimized BIGNUM functions.
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Summary of functionality with and without OpenSSL:
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||||
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`----------------------------`---------`------------
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Functionality built-in OpenSSL
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||||
----------------------------------------------------
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MD5 yes yes
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SHA1 yes yes
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SHA224/256/384/512 yes yes (3)
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||||
Any other digest algo no yes (1)
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||||
Blowfish yes yes
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||||
AES yes yes (2)
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DES/3DES/CAST5 no yes
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Raw encryption yes yes
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||||
PGP Symmetric encryption yes yes
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||||
PGP Public-Key encryption yes yes
|
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----------------------------------------------------
|
||||
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1. Any digest algorithm OpenSSL supports is automatically picked up.
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This is not possible with ciphers, which need to be supported
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||||
explicitly.
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|
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2. AES is included in OpenSSL since version 0.9.7. If pgcrypto is
|
||||
compiled against older version, it will use built-in AES code,
|
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so it has AES always available.
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|
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3. SHA2 algorithms were added to OpenSSL in version 0.9.8. For
|
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older versions, pgcrypto will use built-in code.
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|
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2.2. NULL handling
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||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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||||
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As standard in SQL, all functions return NULL, if any of the arguments
|
||||
are NULL. This may create security risks on careless usage.
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|
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|
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2.3. Security
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
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|
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All the functions here run inside database server. That means that all
|
||||
the data and passwords move between pgcrypto and client application in
|
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clear-text. Thus you must:
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||||
|
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1. Connect locally or use SSL connections.
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2. Trust both system and database administrator.
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||||
|
||||
If you cannot, then better do crypto inside client application.
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|
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|
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3. General hashing
|
||||
--------------------
|
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|
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3.1. digest(data, type)
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
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|
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digest(data text, type text) RETURNS bytea
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digest(data bytea, type text) RETURNS bytea
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||||
|
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Type is here the algorithm to use. Standard algorithms are `md5` and
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`sha1`, although there may be more supported, depending on build
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options.
|
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|
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Returns binary hash.
|
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|
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If you want hexadecimal string, use `encode()` on result. Example:
|
||||
|
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CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION sha1(bytea) RETURNS text AS $$
|
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SELECT encode(digest($1, 'sha1'), 'hex')
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$$ LANGUAGE SQL STRICT IMMUTABLE;
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|
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|
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3.2. hmac(data, key, type)
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
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|
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hmac(data text, key text, type text) RETURNS bytea
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hmac(data bytea, key text, type text) RETURNS bytea
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|
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Calculates Hashed MAC over data. `type` is the same as in `digest()`.
|
||||
If the key is larger than hash block size it will first hashed and the
|
||||
hash will be used as key.
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|
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It is similar to digest() but the hash can be recalculated only knowing
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||||
the key. This avoids the scenario of someone altering data and also
|
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changing the hash.
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|
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Returns binary hash.
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||||
|
||||
|
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|
||||
4. Password hashing
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||||
---------------------
|
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|
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The functions `crypt()` and `gen_salt()` are specifically designed
|
||||
for hashing passwords. `crypt()` does the hashing and `gen_salt()`
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||||
prepares algorithm parameters for it.
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|
||||
The algorithms in `crypt()` differ from usual hashing algorithms like
|
||||
MD5 or SHA1 in following respects:
|
||||
|
||||
1. They are slow. As the amount of data is so small, this is only
|
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way to make brute-forcing passwords hard.
|
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2. Include random 'salt' with result, so that users having same
|
||||
password would have different crypted passwords. This is also
|
||||
additional defense against reversing the algorithm.
|
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3. Include algorithm type in the result, so passwords hashed with
|
||||
different algorithms can co-exist.
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4. Some of them are adaptive - that means after computers get
|
||||
faster, you can tune the algorithm to be slower, without
|
||||
introducing incompatibility with existing passwords.
|
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|
||||
Supported algorithms:
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||||
`------`-------------`---------`----------`---------------------------
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Type Max password Adaptive Salt bits Description
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
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`bf` 72 yes 128 Blowfish-based, variant 2a
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`md5` unlimited no 48 md5-based crypt()
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`xdes` 8 yes 24 Extended DES
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`des` 8 no 12 Original UNIX crypt
|
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
4.1. crypt(password, salt)
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
|
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crypt(password text, salt text) RETURNS text
|
||||
|
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Calculates UN*X crypt(3) style hash of password. When storing new
|
||||
password, you need to use function `gen_salt()` to generate new salt.
|
||||
When checking password you should use existing hash as salt.
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|
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Example - setting new password:
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|
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UPDATE .. SET pswhash = crypt('new password', gen_salt('md5'));
|
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|
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Example - authentication:
|
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|
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SELECT pswhash = crypt('entered password', pswhash) WHERE .. ;
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|
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returns true or false whether the entered password is correct.
|
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It also can return NULL if `pswhash` field is NULL.
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|
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|
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4.2. gen_salt(type)
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
|
||||
gen_salt(type text) RETURNS text
|
||||
|
||||
Generates a new random salt for usage in `crypt()`. For adaptible
|
||||
algorithms, it uses the default iteration count.
|
||||
|
||||
Accepted types are: `des`, `xdes`, `md5` and `bf`.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
4.3. gen_salt(type, rounds)
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||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
|
||||
gen_salt(type text, rounds integer) RETURNS text
|
||||
|
||||
Same as above, but lets user specify iteration count for some
|
||||
algorithms. The higher the count, the more time it takes to hash
|
||||
the password and therefore the more time to break it. Although with
|
||||
too high count the time to calculate a hash may be several years
|
||||
- which is somewhat impractical.
|
||||
|
||||
Number is algorithm specific:
|
||||
|
||||
`-----'---------'-----'----------
|
||||
type default min max
|
||||
---------------------------------
|
||||
`xdes` 725 1 16777215
|
||||
`bf` 6 4 31
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||||
---------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
In case of xdes there is a additional limitation that the count must be
|
||||
a odd number.
|
||||
|
||||
Notes:
|
||||
|
||||
- Original DES crypt was designed to have the speed of 4 hashes per
|
||||
second on the hardware of that time.
|
||||
- Slower than 4 hashes per second would probably dampen usability.
|
||||
- Faster than 100 hashes per second is probably too fast.
|
||||
- See next section about possible values for `crypt-bf`.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
4.4. Comparison of crypt and regular hashes
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
|
||||
Here is a table that should give overview of relative slowness
|
||||
of different hashing algorithms.
|
||||
|
||||
* The goal is to crack a 8-character password, which consists:
|
||||
1. Only of lowercase letters
|
||||
2. Numbers, lower- and uppercase letters.
|
||||
* The table below shows how much time it would take to try all
|
||||
combinations of characters.
|
||||
* The `crypt-bf` is featured in several settings - the number
|
||||
after slash is the `rounds` parameter of `gen_salt()`.
|
||||
|
||||
`------------'----------'--------------'--------------------
|
||||
Algorithm Hashes/sec Chars: [a-z] Chars: [A-Za-z0-9]
|
||||
------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
crypt-bf/8 28 246 years 251322 years
|
||||
crypt-bf/7 57 121 years 123457 years
|
||||
crypt-bf/6 112 62 years 62831 years
|
||||
crypt-bf/5 211 33 years 33351 years
|
||||
crypt-md5 2681 2.6 years 2625 years
|
||||
crypt-des 362837 7 days 19 years
|
||||
sha1 590223 4 days 12 years
|
||||
md5 2345086 1 day 3 years
|
||||
------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
* The machine used is 1.5GHz Pentium 4.
|
||||
* crypt-des and crypt-md5 algorithm numbers are taken from
|
||||
John the Ripper v1.6.38 `-test` output.
|
||||
* MD5 numbers are from mdcrack 1.2.
|
||||
* SHA1 numbers are from lcrack-20031130-beta.
|
||||
* `crypt-bf` numbers are taken using simple program that loops
|
||||
over 1000 8-character passwords. That way I can show the speed with
|
||||
different number of rounds. For reference: `john -test` shows 213
|
||||
loops/sec for crypt-bf/5. (The small difference in results is in
|
||||
accordance to the fact that the `crypt-bf` implementation in pgcrypto
|
||||
is same one that is used in John the Ripper.)
|
||||
|
||||
Note that "try all combinations" is not a realistic exercise.
|
||||
Usually password cracking is done with the help of dictionaries, which
|
||||
contain both regular words and various mutations of them. So, even
|
||||
somewhat word-like passwords could be cracked much faster than the above
|
||||
numbers suggest, and a 6-character non-word like password may escape
|
||||
cracking. Or not.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
5. PGP encryption
|
||||
-------------------
|
||||
|
||||
The functions here implement the encryption part of OpenPGP (RFC2440)
|
||||
standard. Supported are both symmetric-key and public-key encryption.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
5.1. Overview
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
|
||||
Encrypted PGP message consists of 2 packets:
|
||||
|
||||
- Packet for session key - either symmetric- or public-key encrypted.
|
||||
- Packet for session-key encrypted data.
|
||||
|
||||
When encrypting with password:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Given password is hashed using String2Key (S2K) algorithm. This
|
||||
is rather similar to `crypt()` algorithm - purposefully slow
|
||||
and with random salt - but it produces a full-length binary key.
|
||||
2. If separate session key is requested, new random key will be
|
||||
generated. Otherwise S2K key will be used directly as session key.
|
||||
3. If S2K key is to be used directly, then only S2K settings will be put
|
||||
into session key packet. Otherwise session key will be encrypted with
|
||||
S2K key and put into session key packet.
|
||||
|
||||
When encrypting with public key:
|
||||
|
||||
1. New random session key is generated.
|
||||
2. It is encrypted using public key and put into session key packet.
|
||||
|
||||
Now common part, the session-key encrypted data packet:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Optional data-manipulation: compression, conversion to UTF-8,
|
||||
conversion of line-endings.
|
||||
2. Data is prefixed with block of random bytes. This is equal
|
||||
to using random IV.
|
||||
3. A SHA1 hash of random prefix and data is appended.
|
||||
4. All this is encrypted with session key.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
5.2. pgp_sym_encrypt(data, psw)
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
|
||||
pgp_sym_encrypt(data text, psw text [, options text] ) RETURNS bytea
|
||||
pgp_sym_encrypt_bytea(data bytea, psw text [, options text] ) RETURNS bytea
|
||||
|
||||
Return a symmetric-key encrypted PGP message.
|
||||
|
||||
Options are described in section 5.8.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
5.3. pgp_sym_decrypt(msg, psw)
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
|
||||
pgp_sym_decrypt(msg bytea, psw text [, options text] ) RETURNS text
|
||||
pgp_sym_decrypt_bytea(msg bytea, psw text [, options text] ) RETURNS bytea
|
||||
|
||||
Decrypt a symmetric-key encrypted PGP message.
|
||||
|
||||
Decrypting bytea data with `pgp_sym_decrypt` is disallowed.
|
||||
This is to avoid outputting invalid character data. Decrypting
|
||||
originally textual data with `pgp_sym_decrypt_bytea` is fine.
|
||||
|
||||
Options are described in section 5.8.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
5.4. pgp_pub_encrypt(data, pub_key)
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
|
||||
pgp_pub_encrypt(data text, key bytea [, options text] ) RETURNS bytea
|
||||
pgp_pub_encrypt_bytea(data bytea, key bytea [, options text] ) RETURNS bytea
|
||||
|
||||
Encrypt data with a public key. Giving this function a secret key will
|
||||
produce a error.
|
||||
|
||||
Options are described in section 5.8.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
5.5. pgp_pub_decrypt(msg, sec_key [, psw])
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
|
||||
pgp_pub_decrypt(msg bytea, key bytea [, psw text [, options text]] ) \
|
||||
RETURNS text
|
||||
pgp_pub_decrypt_bytea(msg bytea, key bytea [,psw text [, options text]] ) \
|
||||
RETURNS bytea
|
||||
|
||||
Decrypt a public-key encrypted message with secret key. If the secret
|
||||
key is password-protected, you must give the password in `psw`. If
|
||||
there is no password, but you want to specify option for function, you
|
||||
need to give empty password.
|
||||
|
||||
Decrypting bytea data with `pgp_pub_decrypt` is disallowed.
|
||||
This is to avoid outputting invalid character data. Decrypting
|
||||
originally textual data with `pgp_pub_decrypt_bytea` is fine.
|
||||
|
||||
Options are described in section 5.8.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
5.6. pgp_key_id(key / msg)
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
|
||||
pgp_key_id(key or msg bytea) RETURNS text
|
||||
|
||||
It shows you either key ID if given PGP public or secret key. Or it
|
||||
gives the key ID that was used for encrypting the data, if given
|
||||
encrypted message.
|
||||
|
||||
It can return 2 special key IDs:
|
||||
|
||||
SYMKEY::
|
||||
The data is encrypted with symmetric key.
|
||||
|
||||
ANYKEY::
|
||||
The data is public-key encrypted, but the key ID is cleared.
|
||||
That means you need to try all your secret keys on it to see
|
||||
which one decrypts it. pgcrypto itself does not produce such
|
||||
messages.
|
||||
|
||||
Note that different keys may have same ID. This is rare but normal
|
||||
event. Client application should then try to decrypt with each one,
|
||||
to see which fits - like handling ANYKEY.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
5.7. armor / dearmor
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
|
||||
armor(data bytea) RETURNS text
|
||||
dearmor(data text) RETURNS bytea
|
||||
|
||||
Those wrap/unwrap data into PGP Ascii Armor which is basically Base64
|
||||
with CRC and additional formatting.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
5.8. Options for PGP functions
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
|
||||
Options are named to be similar to GnuPG. Values should be given after
|
||||
an equal sign; separate options from each other with commas. Example:
|
||||
|
||||
pgp_sym_encrypt(data, psw, 'compress-algo=1, cipher-algo=aes256')
|
||||
|
||||
All of the options except `convert-crlf` apply only to encrypt
|
||||
functions. Decrypt functions get the parameters from PGP data.
|
||||
|
||||
Most interesting options are probably `compression-algo` and
|
||||
`unicode-mode`. The rest should have reasonable defaults.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
cipher-algo::
|
||||
What cipher algorithm to use.
|
||||
|
||||
Values: bf, aes128, aes192, aes256 (OpenSSL-only: `3des`, `cast5`)
|
||||
Default: aes128
|
||||
Applies: pgp_sym_encrypt, pgp_pub_encrypt
|
||||
|
||||
compress-algo::
|
||||
Which compression algorithm to use. Needs building with zlib.
|
||||
|
||||
Values:
|
||||
0 - no compression
|
||||
1 - ZIP compression
|
||||
2 - ZLIB compression [=ZIP plus meta-data and block-CRC's]
|
||||
Default: 0
|
||||
Applies: pgp_sym_encrypt, pgp_pub_encrypt
|
||||
|
||||
compress-level::
|
||||
How much to compress. Bigger level compresses smaller but is slower.
|
||||
0 disables compression.
|
||||
|
||||
Values: 0, 1-9
|
||||
Default: 6
|
||||
Applies: pgp_sym_encrypt, pgp_pub_encrypt
|
||||
|
||||
convert-crlf::
|
||||
Whether to convert `\n` into `\r\n` when encrypting and `\r\n` to `\n`
|
||||
when decrypting. RFC2440 specifies that text data should be stored
|
||||
using `\r\n` line-feeds. Use this to get fully RFC-compliant
|
||||
behavior.
|
||||
|
||||
Values: 0, 1
|
||||
Default: 0
|
||||
Applies: pgp_sym_encrypt, pgp_pub_encrypt, pgp_sym_decrypt, pgp_pub_decrypt
|
||||
|
||||
disable-mdc::
|
||||
Do not protect data with SHA-1. Only good reason to use this
|
||||
option is to achieve compatibility with ancient PGP products, as the
|
||||
SHA-1 protected packet is from upcoming update to RFC2440. (Currently
|
||||
at version RFC2440bis-14.) Recent gnupg.org and pgp.com software
|
||||
supports it fine.
|
||||
|
||||
Values: 0, 1
|
||||
Default: 0
|
||||
Applies: pgp_sym_encrypt, pgp_pub_encrypt
|
||||
|
||||
enable-session-key::
|
||||
Use separate session key. Public-key encryption always uses separate
|
||||
session key, this is for symmetric-key encryption, which by default
|
||||
uses S2K directly.
|
||||
|
||||
Values: 0, 1
|
||||
Default: 0
|
||||
Applies: pgp_sym_encrypt
|
||||
|
||||
s2k-mode::
|
||||
Which S2K algorithm to use.
|
||||
|
||||
Values:
|
||||
0 - Without salt. Dangerous!
|
||||
1 - With salt but with fixed iteration count.
|
||||
3 - Variable iteration count.
|
||||
Default: 3
|
||||
Applies: pgp_sym_encrypt
|
||||
|
||||
s2k-digest-algo::
|
||||
Which digest algorithm to use in S2K calculation.
|
||||
|
||||
Values: md5, sha1
|
||||
Default: sha1
|
||||
Applies: pgp_sym_encrypt
|
||||
|
||||
s2k-cipher-algo::
|
||||
Which cipher to use for encrypting separate session key.
|
||||
|
||||
Values: bf, aes, aes128, aes192, aes256
|
||||
Default: use cipher-algo.
|
||||
Applies: pgp_sym_encrypt
|
||||
|
||||
unicode-mode::
|
||||
Whether to convert textual data from database internal encoding to
|
||||
UTF-8 and back. If your database already is UTF-8, no conversion will
|
||||
be done, only the data will be tagged as UTF-8. Without this option
|
||||
it will not be.
|
||||
|
||||
Values: 0, 1
|
||||
Default: 0
|
||||
Applies: pgp_sym_encrypt, pgp_pub_encrypt
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
5.9. Generating keys with GnuPG
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
|
||||
Generate a new key:
|
||||
|
||||
gpg --gen-key
|
||||
|
||||
The preferred key type is "DSA and Elgamal".
|
||||
|
||||
For RSA encryption you must create either DSA or RSA sign-only key
|
||||
as master and then add RSA encryption subkey with `gpg --edit-key`.
|
||||
|
||||
List keys:
|
||||
|
||||
gpg --list-secret-keys
|
||||
|
||||
Export ascii-armored public key:
|
||||
|
||||
gpg -a --export KEYID > public.key
|
||||
|
||||
Export ascii-armored secret key:
|
||||
|
||||
gpg -a --export-secret-keys KEYID > secret.key
|
||||
|
||||
You need to use `dearmor()` on them before giving them to
|
||||
pgp_pub_* functions. Or if you can handle binary data, you can drop
|
||||
"-a" from gpg.
|
||||
|
||||
For more details see `man gpg`, http://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/manual.html[
|
||||
The GNU Privacy Handbook] and other docs on http://www.gnupg.org[] site.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
5.10. Limitations of PGP code
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
|
||||
- No support for signing. That also means that it is not checked
|
||||
whether the encryption subkey belongs to master key.
|
||||
|
||||
- No support for encryption key as master key. As such practice
|
||||
is generally discouraged, it should not be a problem.
|
||||
|
||||
- No support for several subkeys. This may seem like a problem, as this
|
||||
is common practice. On the other hand, you should not use your regular
|
||||
GPG/PGP keys with pgcrypto, but create new ones, as the usage scenario
|
||||
is rather different.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
6. Raw encryption
|
||||
-------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Those functions only run a cipher over data, they don't have any advanced
|
||||
features of PGP encryption. Therefore they have some major problems:
|
||||
|
||||
1. They use user key directly as cipher key.
|
||||
2. They don't provide any integrity checking, to see
|
||||
if the encrypted data was modified.
|
||||
3. They expect that users manage all encryption parameters
|
||||
themselves, even IV.
|
||||
4. They don't handle text.
|
||||
|
||||
So, with the introduction of PGP encryption, usage of raw
|
||||
encryption functions is discouraged.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
encrypt(data bytea, key bytea, type text) RETURNS bytea
|
||||
decrypt(data bytea, key bytea, type text) RETURNS bytea
|
||||
|
||||
encrypt_iv(data bytea, key bytea, iv bytea, type text) RETURNS bytea
|
||||
decrypt_iv(data bytea, key bytea, iv bytea, type text) RETURNS bytea
|
||||
|
||||
Encrypt/decrypt data with cipher, padding data if needed.
|
||||
|
||||
`type` parameter description in pseudo-noteup:
|
||||
|
||||
algo ['-' mode] ['/pad:' padding]
|
||||
|
||||
Supported algorithms:
|
||||
|
||||
* `bf` - Blowfish
|
||||
* `aes` - AES (Rijndael-128)
|
||||
|
||||
Modes:
|
||||
|
||||
* `cbc` - next block depends on previous. (default)
|
||||
* `ecb` - each block is encrypted separately.
|
||||
(for testing only)
|
||||
|
||||
Padding:
|
||||
|
||||
* `pkcs` - data may be any length (default)
|
||||
* `none` - data must be multiple of cipher block size.
|
||||
|
||||
IV is initial value for mode, defaults to all zeroes. It is ignored for
|
||||
ECB. It is clipped or padded with zeroes if not exactly block size.
|
||||
|
||||
So, example:
|
||||
|
||||
encrypt(data, 'fooz', 'bf')
|
||||
|
||||
is equal to
|
||||
|
||||
encrypt(data, 'fooz', 'bf-cbc/pad:pkcs')
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
7. Random bytes
|
||||
-----------------
|
||||
|
||||
gen_random_bytes(count integer)
|
||||
|
||||
Returns `count` cryptographically strong random bytes as bytea value.
|
||||
There can be maximally 1024 bytes extracted at a time. This is to avoid
|
||||
draining the randomness generator pool.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
8. Credits
|
||||
------------
|
||||
|
||||
I have used code from following sources:
|
||||
|
||||
`--------------------`-------------------------`-------------------------------
|
||||
Algorithm Author Source origin
|
||||
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
DES crypt() David Burren and others FreeBSD libcrypt
|
||||
MD5 crypt() Poul-Henning Kamp FreeBSD libcrypt
|
||||
Blowfish crypt() Solar Designer www.openwall.com
|
||||
Blowfish cipher Simon Tatham PuTTY
|
||||
Rijndael cipher Brian Gladman OpenBSD sys/crypto
|
||||
MD5 and SHA1 WIDE Project KAME kame/sys/crypto
|
||||
SHA256/384/512 Aaron D. Gifford OpenBSD sys/crypto
|
||||
BIGNUM math Michael J. Fromberger dartmouth.edu/~sting/sw/imath
|
||||
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
9. Legalese
|
||||
-------------
|
||||
|
||||
* I owe a beer to Poul-Henning.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
10. References/Links
|
||||
----------------------
|
||||
|
||||
10.1. Useful reading
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
|
||||
http://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/manual.html[]::
|
||||
The GNU Privacy Handbook
|
||||
|
||||
http://www.openwall.com/crypt/[]::
|
||||
Describes the crypt-blowfish algorithm.
|
||||
|
||||
http://www.stack.nl/~galactus/remailers/passphrase-faq.html[]::
|
||||
How to choose good password.
|
||||
|
||||
http://world.std.com/~reinhold/diceware.html[]::
|
||||
Interesting idea for picking passwords.
|
||||
|
||||
http://www.interhack.net/people/cmcurtin/snake-oil-faq.html[]::
|
||||
Describes good and bad cryptography.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
10.2. Technical references
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
|
||||
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2440.txt[]::
|
||||
OpenPGP message format
|
||||
|
||||
http://www.imc.org/draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis[]::
|
||||
New version of RFC2440.
|
||||
|
||||
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1321.txt[]::
|
||||
The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm
|
||||
|
||||
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2104.txt[]::
|
||||
HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication
|
||||
|
||||
http://www.usenix.org/events/usenix99/provos.html[]::
|
||||
Comparison of crypt-des, crypt-md5 and bcrypt algorithms.
|
||||
|
||||
http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/des.htm[]::
|
||||
Standards for DES, 3DES and AES.
|
||||
|
||||
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fortuna_(PRNG)[]::
|
||||
Description of Fortuna CSPRNG.
|
||||
|
||||
http://jlcooke.ca/random/[]::
|
||||
Jean-Luc Cooke Fortuna-based /dev/random driver for Linux.
|
||||
|
||||
http://www.cs.ut.ee/~helger/crypto/[]::
|
||||
Collection of cryptology pointers.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
// $PostgreSQL: pgsql/contrib/pgcrypto/README.pgcrypto,v 1.19 2007/03/28 22:48:58 neilc Exp $
|
Reference in New Issue
Block a user