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Remove support for OpenSSL 1.0.1

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Here are some notes about this change:
- As X509_get_signature_nid() should always exist (OpenSSL and
LibreSSL), hence HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID is now gone.
- OPENSSL_API_COMPAT is bumped to 0x10002000L.
- One comment related to 1.0.1e introduced by 74242c2 is removed.

Upstream OpenSSL still provides long-term support for 1.0.2 in a closed
fashion, so removing it is out of scope for a few years, at least.

Reviewed-by: Jacob Champion, Daniel Gustafsson
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/ZG3JNursG69dz1lr@paquier.xyz
This commit is contained in:
Michael Paquier
2023-07-03 13:20:27 +09:00
parent 2aeaf80e57
commit 8e278b6576
14 changed files with 37 additions and 100 deletions
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20
src/backend/libpq/auth-scram.c
View File

@@ -209,10 +209,9 @@ scram_get_mechanisms(Port *port, StringInfo buf)
/*
* Advertise the mechanisms in decreasing order of importance. So the
* channel-binding variants go first, if they are supported. Channel
* binding is only supported with SSL, and only if the SSL implementation
* has a function to get the certificate's hash.
* binding is only supported with SSL.
*/
#ifdef HAVE_BE_TLS_GET_CERTIFICATE_HASH
#ifdef USE_SSL
if (port->ssl_in_use)
{
appendStringInfoString(buf, SCRAM_SHA_256_PLUS_NAME);
@@ -251,13 +250,12 @@ scram_init(Port *port, const char *selected_mech, const char *shadow_pass)
/*
* Parse the selected mechanism.
*
* Note that if we don't support channel binding, either because the SSL
* implementation doesn't support it or we're not using SSL at all, we
* would not have advertised the PLUS variant in the first place. If the
* client nevertheless tries to select it, it's a protocol violation like
* selecting any other SASL mechanism we don't support.
* Note that if we don't support channel binding, or if we're not using
* SSL at all, we would not have advertised the PLUS variant in the first
* place. If the client nevertheless tries to select it, it's a protocol
* violation like selecting any other SASL mechanism we don't support.
*/
#ifdef HAVE_BE_TLS_GET_CERTIFICATE_HASH
#ifdef USE_SSL
if (strcmp(selected_mech, SCRAM_SHA_256_PLUS_NAME) == 0 && port->ssl_in_use)
state->channel_binding_in_use = true;
else
@@ -1010,7 +1008,7 @@ read_client_first_message(scram_state *state, const char *input)
errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
errdetail("The client selected SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS, but the SCRAM message does not include channel binding data.")));
#ifdef HAVE_BE_TLS_GET_CERTIFICATE_HASH
#ifdef USE_SSL
if (state->port->ssl_in_use)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
@@ -1306,7 +1304,7 @@ read_client_final_message(scram_state *state, const char *input)
channel_binding = read_attr_value(&p, 'c');
if (state->channel_binding_in_use)
{
#ifdef HAVE_BE_TLS_GET_CERTIFICATE_HASH
#ifdef USE_SSL
const char *cbind_data = NULL;
size_t cbind_data_len = 0;
size_t cbind_header_len;

4
src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c
View File

@@ -831,8 +831,6 @@ be_tls_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
*
* These functions are closely modelled on the standard socket BIO in OpenSSL;
* see sock_read() and sock_write() in OpenSSL's crypto/bio/bss_sock.c.
* XXX OpenSSL 1.0.1e considers many more errcodes than just EINTR as reasons
* to retry; do we need to adopt their logic for that?
*/
#ifndef HAVE_BIO_GET_DATA
@@ -1429,7 +1427,6 @@ be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
ptr[0] = '\0';
}
#if defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID) || defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_INFO)
char *
be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len)
{
@@ -1488,7 +1485,6 @@ be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len)
return cert_hash;
}
#endif
/*
* Convert an X509 subject name to a cstring.