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Fix column-privilege leak in error-message paths

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While building error messages to return to the user,
BuildIndexValueDescription, ExecBuildSlotValueDescription and
ri_ReportViolation would happily include the entire key or entire row in
the result returned to the user, even if the user didn't have access to
view all of the columns being included.

Instead, include only those columns which the user is providing or which
the user has select rights on.  If the user does not have any rights
to view the table or any of the columns involved then no detail is
provided and a NULL value is returned from BuildIndexValueDescription
and ExecBuildSlotValueDescription.  Note that, for key cases, the user
must have access to all of the columns for the key to be shown; a
partial key will not be returned.

Further, in master only, do not return any data for cases where row
security is enabled on the relation and row security should be applied
for the user.  This required a bit of refactoring and moving of things
around related to RLS- note the addition of utils/misc/rls.c.

Back-patch all the way, as column-level privileges are now in all
supported versions.

This has been assigned CVE-2014-8161, but since the issue and the patch
have already been publicized on pgsql-hackers, there's no point in trying
to hide this commit.
This commit is contained in:
Stephen Frost
2015-01-12 17:04:11 -05:00
parent acc2b1e843
commit 804b6b6db4
20 changed files with 569 additions and 194 deletions
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36
src/include/rewrite/rowsecurity.h
View File

@@ -34,40 +34,6 @@ typedef struct RowSecurityDesc
List *policies; /* list of row security policies */
} RowSecurityDesc;
/* GUC variable */
extern int row_security;
/* Possible values for row_security GUC */
typedef enum RowSecurityConfigType
{
ROW_SECURITY_OFF, /* RLS never applied- error thrown if no priv */
ROW_SECURITY_ON, /* normal case, RLS applied for regular users */
ROW_SECURITY_FORCE /* RLS applied for superusers and table owners */
} RowSecurityConfigType;
/*
* Used by callers of check_enable_rls.
*
* RLS could be completely disabled on the tables involved in the query,
* which is the simple case, or it may depend on the current environment
* (the role which is running the query or the value of the row_security
* GUC- on, off, or force), or it might be simply enabled as usual.
*
* If RLS isn't on the table involved then RLS_NONE is returned to indicate
* that we don't need to worry about invalidating the query plan for RLS
* reasons. If RLS is on the table, but we are bypassing it for now, then
* we return RLS_NONE_ENV to indicate that, if the environment changes,
* we need to invalidate and replan. Finally, if RLS should be turned on
* for the query, then we return RLS_ENABLED, which means we also need to
* invalidate if the environment changes.
*/
enum CheckEnableRlsResult
{
RLS_NONE,
RLS_NONE_ENV,
RLS_ENABLED
};
typedef List *(*row_security_policy_hook_type)(CmdType cmdtype,
Relation relation);
@@ -76,6 +42,4 @@ extern PGDLLIMPORT row_security_policy_hook_type row_security_policy_hook;
extern bool prepend_row_security_policies(Query* root, RangeTblEntry* rte,
int rt_index);
extern int check_enable_rls(Oid relid, Oid checkAsUser);
#endif /* ROWSECURITY_H */