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Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.

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Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement.  Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest.  In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.

Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions).  The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.

Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.

Security: CVE-2014-0064
This commit is contained in:
Noah Misch
2014-02-17 09:33:31 -05:00
parent e4a4fa2235
commit 7a362a176a
15 changed files with 177 additions and 19 deletions
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9
contrib/intarray/_int_bool.c
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@ -448,6 +448,9 @@ boolop(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
static void
findoprnd(ITEM *ptr, int32 *pos)
{
/* since this function recurses, it could be driven to stack overflow. */
check_stack_depth();
#ifdef BS_DEBUG
elog(DEBUG3, (ptr[*pos].type == OPR) ?
"%d %c" : "%d %d", *pos, ptr[*pos].val);
@ -508,7 +511,13 @@ bqarr_in(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("empty query")));
if (state.num > QUERYTYPEMAXITEMS)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_PROGRAM_LIMIT_EXCEEDED),
errmsg("number of query items (%d) exceeds the maximum allowed (%d)",
state.num, (int) QUERYTYPEMAXITEMS)));
commonlen = COMPUTESIZE(state.num);
query = (QUERYTYPE *) palloc(commonlen);
SET_VARSIZE(query, commonlen);
query->size = state.num;