From 5293cc8eb915f5f45ec206d3e770092b50cf445b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Magnus Hagander Date: Wed, 9 Dec 2009 06:37:09 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Reject certificates with embedded NULLs in the commonName field. This stops attacks where an attacker would put \0 in the field and trick the validation code that the certificate was for . This is a very low risk attack since it reuqires the attacker to trick the CA into issuing a certificate with an incorrect field, and the common PostgreSQL deployments are with private CAs, and not external ones. Also, default mode in 8.4 does not do any name validation, and is thus also not vulnerable - but the higher security modes are. Backpatch all the way. Even though versions 8.3.x and before didn't have certificate name validation support, they still exposed this field for the user to perform the validation in the application code, and there is no way to detect this problem through that API. Security: CVE-2009-4034 --- src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-- src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c index b854d4337c7..589424c6dd4 100644 --- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c +++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ * * * IDENTIFICATION - * $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c,v 1.43.2.5 2009/01/28 15:06:48 mha Exp $ + * $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c,v 1.43.2.6 2009/12/09 06:37:09 mha Exp $ * * Since the server static private key ($DataDir/server.key) * will normally be stored unencrypted so that the database @@ -801,12 +801,34 @@ open_server_SSL(Port *port) } else { + int r; + X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(port->peer), port->peer_dn, sizeof(port->peer_dn)); port->peer_dn[sizeof(port->peer_dn) - 1] = '\0'; - X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name(port->peer), + r = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name(port->peer), NID_commonName, port->peer_cn, sizeof(port->peer_cn)); port->peer_cn[sizeof(port->peer_cn) - 1] = '\0'; + if (r == -1) + { + /* Unable to get the CN, set it to blank so it can't be used */ + port->peer_cn[0] = '\0'; + } + else + { + /* + * Reject embedded NULLs in certificate common name to prevent attacks like + * CVE-2009-4034. + */ + if (r != strlen(port->peer_cn)) + { + ereport(COMMERROR, + (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION), + errmsg("SSL certificate's common name contains embedded null"))); + close_SSL(port); + return -1; + } + } } ereport(DEBUG2, (errmsg("SSL connection from \"%s\"", port->peer_cn))); diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c index 3a445b780d0..ed85c452d45 100644 --- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c +++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ * * * IDENTIFICATION - * $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c,v 1.32.2.2 2009/01/28 15:06:48 mha Exp $ + * $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c,v 1.32.2.3 2009/12/09 06:37:09 mha Exp $ * * NOTES * The client *requires* a valid server certificate. Since @@ -967,9 +967,28 @@ open_client_SSL(PGconn *conn) conn->peer_dn, sizeof(conn->peer_dn)); conn->peer_dn[sizeof(conn->peer_dn) - 1] = '\0'; - X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name(conn->peer), + r = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name(conn->peer), NID_commonName, conn->peer_cn, SM_USER); - conn->peer_cn[SM_USER] = '\0'; + conn->peer_cn[SM_USER] = '\0'; /* buffer is SM_USER+1 chars! */ + if (r == -1) + { + /* Unable to get the CN, set it to blank so it can't be used */ + conn->peer_cn[0] = '\0'; + } + else + { + /* + * Reject embedded NULLs in certificate common name to prevent attacks like + * CVE-2009-4034. + */ + if (r != strlen(conn->peer_cn)) + { + printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage, + libpq_gettext("SSL certificate's common name contains embedded null\n")); + close_SSL(conn); + return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED; + } + } /* verify that the common name resolves to peer */