The negative tests accepted any non-zero client status, and the openssl.test
capability and protocol probes read only a command's output. A run killed by
timeout(1) therefore looked like the certificate rejection, auth failure or
missing feature each site was testing for, and the script still reported
success with the coverage silently dropped.
Check for the timeout statuses (124, and 137 for the SIGKILL used here)
before interpreting a result:
- trusted_peer.test: the three wrong-CA / wrong-peer rejection cases
- tls13.test: cipher mismatch, mutual auth, and the version downgrade cases
- psk.test: the no-peer-cert rejection case
- openssl.test: the seven wolfSSL/OpenSSL certificate capability probes and
the SSLv3, TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 connection probes
Three ways the bounds added here failed to do their job:
- get_first_free_port ended the scan cap with 'exit 1', but every caller
runs it in a command substitution, so only the subshell died. The port
variable came back empty, the next $((port + 1)) evaluated to 1, and the
run limped on to a confusing wait_for_readyFile failure. Forcing the cap
on ocsp-stapling.test: before, the script ran on and hung until an outer
timeout killed it; now it exits 1 at the error. Return instead, and check
the status at all 25 call sites across the six scripts.
- The macOS timeout shim was a shell function. Backgrounding a function
forks a subshell, so $! was the subshell and cleanup killed that while
the server it was meant to stop leaked. Use a prefix variable that
expands to nothing when timeout(1) is absent, keeping $! the real pid.
- timeout -s KILL exits 137, not 124. Sites that read $? and treat any
non-zero as 'feature not compiled in' turned a hang into exit 0, so the
bound made a hang less visible than before. Add timed_out() and check it
before those skip branches; use it for the version probes too, which
matched any status >= 124.
The 'Bad SSL version' probes branch on grep's status, so a client
killed by the 2m timeout read as 'TLS v1.2 supported' and ran the
wrong branch. Take both statuses from PIPESTATUS and fail loudly on
a probe timeout.
A test script that blocks forever burns the CI job's full
timeout-minutes with no logs. e82ecdff93 and 5c5cbd3094 bounded the
waited-on servers; this covers the remaining hang classes in
scripts/*.test:
- Wrap foreground example client/server, openssl s_client, and
openssl ocsp invocations in "timeout -s KILL 2m". A client wedged
before or without a live peer (e.g. blocked in first-seed entropy
gathering, or DTLS with no reset from a dead peer) is not bounded
by its peer's timeout.
- Add the macOS timeout() fallback shim to scripts that now use
timeout.
- Bound the get_first_free_port scan loops (nc -w 1, 100-port cap).
- Add -w 1 to the remaining nc probes and dtls.test UDP pcap markers.
- ocsp-responder-openssl-interop.test: bound the responder reap in
cleanup: give each responder 5 s to exit after SIGTERM, then
SIGKILL before waiting, so a wedged responder cannot hang the EXIT
trap.
- benchmark.test: bound the clients but leave the -i servers
unwrapped: the script ends them with kill -6, which timeout(1)
does not forward, so wrapping would orphan the server.
- trusted_peer/tls13: kill the server with SIGTERM instead of
SIGKILL in cleanup so the signal forwards through the timeout
wrapper to the wrapped server.
The scripts that wait for a server to publish its ready file declare
counter at file scope and never reset it, so the retry budget is shared
by every server start in the script instead of applying to each one.
Once the early cases have used it up, every later create_port() falls
straight through to "NO ready file ending test", kills a server that was
starting normally, and the client then fails with "port number cannot be
0". Retry loops do not help, since the budget is already spent when they
run.
The failure needs only a build whose server start-up is slow enough to
consume a few tenths of a second each time. It showed up in the FIPS
dev-no-POST kernel-settings-all-pqc-asm job, where the server pays for
the CASTs, the PQC algorithms and the vector-register fallback fuzzer:
psk.test gave up after exactly 20 waits and tls13.test after exactly 51,
both the full script budget rather than a per-case one.
Reset counter where the wait begins, which is what the ocsp-stapling
scripts already do. Reproduced with a wrapper that delays the server by
one second: psk.test then fails on its third case before the change and
passes after it.
Mostly combinations of NO_WOLFSSL_CLIENT, NO_WOLFSSL_SERVER and
WOLFSSL_NO_CLIENT_AUTH were failing.
Added configurations to CI loop.
wc_AesGcmDecryptFinal: use WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE to satisfy compiler.
