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mirror of https://github.com/esp8266/Arduino.git synced 2025-04-22 21:23:07 +03:00
Earle F. Philhower, III 53091882b8
Fix minor BearSSL API issues (#4901)
Fixes #4882 and updates GitHub certificate fingerprint to the current one
in BearSSL_Validation example.

When setting a authentication mode or stopping, clear all others out in case
the object is being re-used.

Add in a yield during the SSL handshake to allow a graceful timeout and not
a WDT error when the remote server hiccups.  Thanks to @Jeroen88 for
finding and testing this.
2018-07-16 09:35:00 -07:00

229 lines
7.4 KiB
C++

// Example of the different modes of the X.509 validation options
// in the WiFiClientBearSSL object
//
// Mar 2018 by Earle F. Philhower, III
// Released to the public domain
#include <ESP8266WiFi.h>
#include <time.h>
const char *ssid = "....";
const char *pass = "....";
const char * host = "api.github.com";
const uint16_t port = 443;
const char * path = "/";
// Set time via NTP, as required for x.509 validation
void setClock() {
configTime(3 * 3600, 0, "pool.ntp.org", "time.nist.gov");
Serial.print("Waiting for NTP time sync: ");
time_t now = time(nullptr);
while (now < 8 * 3600 * 2) {
delay(500);
Serial.print(".");
now = time(nullptr);
}
Serial.println("");
struct tm timeinfo;
gmtime_r(&now, &timeinfo);
Serial.print("Current time: ");
Serial.print(asctime(&timeinfo));
}
// Try and connect using a WiFiClientBearSSL to specified host:port and dump HTTP response
void fetchURL(BearSSL::WiFiClientSecure *client, const char *host, const uint16_t port, const char *path) {
if (!path) {
path = "/";
}
Serial.printf("Trying: %s:443...", host);
client->connect(host, port);
if (!client->connected()) {
Serial.printf("*** Can't connect. ***\n-------\n");
return;
}
Serial.printf("Connected!\n-------\n");
client->write("GET ");
client->write(path);
client->write(" HTTP/1.0\r\nHost: ");
client->write(host);
client->write("\r\nUser-Agent: ESP8266\r\n");
client->write("\r\n");
uint32_t to = millis() + 5000;
if (client->connected()) {
do {
char tmp[32];
memset(tmp, 0, 32);
int rlen = client->read((uint8_t*)tmp, sizeof(tmp) - 1);
yield();
if (rlen < 0) {
break;
}
// Only print out first line up to \r, then abort connection
char *nl = strchr(tmp, '\r');
if (nl) {
*nl = 0;
Serial.print(tmp);
break;
}
Serial.print(tmp);
} while (millis() < to);
}
client->stop();
Serial.printf("\n-------\n\n");
}
void fetchNoConfig() {
Serial.printf(R"EOF(
If there are no CAs or insecure options specified, BearSSL will not connect.
Expect the following call to fail as none have been configured.
)EOF");
BearSSL::WiFiClientSecure client;
fetchURL(&client, host, port, path);
}
void fetchInsecure() {
Serial.printf(R"EOF(
This is absolutely *insecure*, but you can tell BearSSL not to check the
certificate of the server. In this mode it will accept ANY certificate,
which is subject to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks.
)EOF");
BearSSL::WiFiClientSecure client;
client.setInsecure();
fetchURL(&client, host, port, path);
}
void fetchFingerprint() {
Serial.printf(R"EOF(
The SHA-1 fingerprint of an X.509 certificate can be used to validate it
instead of the while certificate. This is not nearly as secure as real
X.509 validation, but is better than nothing.
)EOF");
BearSSL::WiFiClientSecure client;
const uint8_t fp[20] = {0x5F, 0xF1, 0x60, 0x31, 0x09, 0x04, 0x3E, 0xF2, 0x90, 0xD2, 0xB0, 0x8A, 0x50, 0x38, 0x04, 0xE8, 0x37, 0x9F, 0xBC, 0x76};
client.setFingerprint(fp);
fetchURL(&client, host, port, path);
}
void fetchSelfSigned() {
Serial.printf(R"EOF(
It is also possible to accept *any* self-signed certificate. This is
absolutely insecure as anyone can make a self-signed certificate.
)EOF");
BearSSL::WiFiClientSecure client;
Serial.printf("First, try and connect to a badssl.com self-signed website (will fail):\n");
fetchURL(&client, "self-signed.badssl.com", 443, "/");
Serial.printf("Now we'll enable self-signed certs (will pass)\n");
client.allowSelfSignedCerts();
fetchURL(&client, "self-signed.badssl.com", 443, "/");
}
void fetchKnownKey() {
Serial.printf(R"EOF(
The server certificate can be completely ignored and its public key
hardcoded in your application. This should be secure as the public key
needs to be paired with the private key of the site, which is obviously
private and not shared. A MITM without the private key would not be
able to establish communications.
)EOF");
// Extracted by: openssl x509 -pubkey -noout -in servercert.pem
static const char pubkey[] PROGMEM = R"KEY(
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAqcCPMEktuxLoDAxdHQgI
95FweH4Fa6+LslU2qmmUBF+pu4ZOUvpIQxVU5wqdWaxZauxG1nYUTrAWdPb1n0um
gLsGE7WYXJnQPJewIK4Qhua0LsrirIdHkcwHQ83NEYj+lswhg0fUQURt06Uta5ak
LovDdJPLqTuTS/nshOa76hR0ouWnrqucLL1szcvX/obB+Nsbmr58Mrg8prQfRoK6
ibzlZysV88qPcCpc57lq6QBKQ2F9WgQMssQigXfTNm8lAAQ+L6gCZngd4KfHYPSJ
YA07oFWmuSOalgh00Wh8PUjuRGrcNxWpmgfALQHHFYgoDcD+a8+GoJk+GdJd3ong
ZQIDAQAB
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
)KEY";
BearSSL::WiFiClientSecure client;
BearSSLPublicKey key(pubkey);
client.setKnownKey(&key);
fetchURL(&client, host, port, path);
}
void fetchCertAuthority() {
static const char digicert[] PROGMEM = R"EOF(
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
)EOF";
Serial.printf(R"EOF(
A specific certification authority can be passed in and used to validate
a chain of certificates from a given server. These will be validated
using BearSSL's rules, which do NOT include certificate revocation lists.
A specific server's certificate, or your own self-signed root certificate
can also be used. ESP8266 time needs to be valid for checks to pass as
BearSSL does verify the notValidBefore/After fields.
)EOF");
BearSSL::WiFiClientSecure client;
BearSSLX509List cert(digicert);
client.setTrustAnchors(&cert);
Serial.printf("Try validating without setting the time (should fail)\n");
fetchURL(&client, host, port, path);
Serial.printf("Try again after setting NTP time (should pass)\n");
setClock();
fetchURL(&client, host, port, path);
}
void setup() {
Serial.begin(115200);
Serial.println();
Serial.println();
// We start by connecting to a WiFi network
Serial.print("Connecting to ");
Serial.println(ssid);
WiFi.mode(WIFI_STA);
WiFi.begin(ssid, pass);
while (WiFi.status() != WL_CONNECTED) {
delay(500);
Serial.print(".");
}
Serial.println("");
Serial.println("WiFi connected");
Serial.println("IP address: ");
Serial.println(WiFi.localIP());
fetchNoConfig();
fetchInsecure();
fetchFingerprint();
fetchSelfSigned();
fetchKnownKey();
fetchCertAuthority();
}
void loop() {
// Nothing to do here
}