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* Basic constraint functionality added.

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git-svn-id: svn://svn.code.sf.net/p/axtls/code/trunk@273 9a5d90b5-6617-0410-8a86-bb477d3ed2e3
This commit is contained in:
cameronrich
2016-12-28 19:43:52 +00:00
committed by Ivan Grokhotkov
parent 2213f30449
commit a2c7c7e40a
7 changed files with 356 additions and 95 deletions
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5
crypto/os_int.h
View File

@@ -41,6 +41,11 @@
extern "C" {
#endif
/* some bool types - just make life easier */
typedef char bool;
#define false 0
#define true 1
#if defined(WIN32)
typedef UINT8 uint8_t;
typedef INT8 int8_t;

174
ssl/asn1.c
View File

@@ -80,6 +80,16 @@ static const uint8_t sig_subject_alt_name[] =
0x55, 0x1d, 0x11
};
static const uint8_t sig_basic_constraints[] =
{
0x55, 0x1d, 0x13
};
static const uint8_t sig_key_usage[] =
{
0x55, 0x1d, 0x0f
};
/* CN, O, OU, L, C, ST */
static const uint8_t g_dn_types[] = { 3, 10, 11, 7, 6, 8 };
@@ -117,6 +127,7 @@ int asn1_next_obj(const uint8_t *buf, int *offset, int obj_type)
{
if (buf[*offset] != obj_type)
return X509_NOT_OK;
(*offset)++;
return get_asn1_length(buf, offset);
}
@@ -141,12 +152,12 @@ int asn1_skip_obj(const uint8_t *buf, int *offset, int obj_type)
* Read an integer value for ASN.1 data
* Note: This function allocates memory which must be freed by the user.
*/
int asn1_get_int(const uint8_t *buf, int *offset, uint8_t **object)
int asn1_get_big_int(const uint8_t *buf, int *offset, uint8_t **object)
{
int len;
if ((len = asn1_next_obj(buf, offset, ASN1_INTEGER)) < 0)
goto end_int_array;
goto end_big_int;
if (len > 1 && buf[*offset] == 0x00) /* ignore the negative byte */
{
@@ -158,10 +169,93 @@ int asn1_get_int(const uint8_t *buf, int *offset, uint8_t **object)
memcpy(*object, &buf[*offset], len);
*offset += len;
end_int_array:
end_big_int:
return len;
}
/**
* Read an integer value for ASN.1 data
*/
int asn1_get_int(const uint8_t *buf, int *offset, int32_t *val)
{
int res = X509_OK;
int len;
int i;
if ((len = asn1_next_obj(buf, offset, ASN1_INTEGER)) < 0 ||
len > sizeof(int32_t))
{
res = X509_NOT_OK;
goto end_int;
}
*val = 0;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
{
*val <<= 8;
*val |= buf[(*offset)++];
}
end_int:
return res;
}
/**
* Read an boolean value for ASN.1 data
*/
int asn1_get_bool(const uint8_t *buf, int *offset, bool *val)
{
int res = X509_OK;
if (asn1_next_obj(buf, offset, ASN1_BOOLEAN) != 1)
{
res = X509_NOT_OK;
goto end_bool;
}
/* DER demands that "If the encoding represents the boolean value TRUE,
its single contents octet shall have all eight bits set to one."
Thus only 0 and 255 are valid encoded values. */
*val = buf[(*offset)++] == 0xFF;
end_bool:
return res;
}
/**
* Convert an ASN.1 bit string into a 32 bit integer
*/
int asn1_get_bit_string_as_int(const uint8_t *buf, int *offset, uint32_t *val)
{
int res = X509_OK;
int len, i;
int ignore_bits;
if ((len = asn1_next_obj(buf, offset, ASN1_BIT_STRING)) < 0 || len > 5)
{
res = X509_NOT_OK;
goto end_bit_string_as_int;
}
/* number of bits left unused in the final byte of content */
ignore_bits = buf[(*offset)++];
len--;
*val = 0;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
{
*val <<= 8;
*val |= buf[(*offset)++];
}
for (i = 0; i < ignore_bits; i++)
{
*val >>= 1;
}
end_bit_string_as_int:
return res;
}
/**
* Get all the RSA private key specifics from an ASN.1 encoded file
*/
@@ -187,19 +281,19 @@ int asn1_get_private_key(const uint8_t *buf, int len, RSA_CTX **rsa_ctx)
/* Use the private key to mix up the RNG if possible. */
RNG_custom_init(buf, len);
mod_len = asn1_get_int(buf, &offset, &modulus);
pub_len = asn1_get_int(buf, &offset, &pub_exp);
priv_len = asn1_get_int(buf, &offset, &priv_exp);
mod_len = asn1_get_big_int(buf, &offset, &modulus);
pub_len = asn1_get_big_int(buf, &offset, &pub_exp);
priv_len = asn1_get_big_int(buf, &offset, &priv_exp);
if (mod_len <= 0 || pub_len <= 0 || priv_len <= 0)
return X509_INVALID_PRIV_KEY;
#ifdef CONFIG_BIGINT_CRT
p_len = asn1_get_int(buf, &offset, &p);
q_len = asn1_get_int(buf, &offset, &q);
dP_len = asn1_get_int(buf, &offset, &dP);
dQ_len = asn1_get_int(buf, &offset, &dQ);
qInv_len = asn1_get_int(buf, &offset, &qInv);
p_len = asn1_get_big_int(buf, &offset, &p);
q_len = asn1_get_big_int(buf, &offset, &q);
dP_len = asn1_get_big_int(buf, &offset, &dP);
dQ_len = asn1_get_big_int(buf, &offset, &dQ);
qInv_len = asn1_get_big_int(buf, &offset, &qInv);
if (p_len <= 0 || q_len <= 0 || dP_len <= 0 || dQ_len <= 0 || qInv_len <= 0)
return X509_INVALID_PRIV_KEY;
@@ -295,25 +389,12 @@ static int asn1_get_utc_time(const uint8_t *buf, int *offset, time_t *t)
}
/**
* Get the version type of a certificate (which we don't actually care about)
* Get the version type of a certificate
*/
int asn1_version(const uint8_t *cert, int *offset, X509_CTX *x509_ctx)
int asn1_version(const uint8_t *cert, int *offset, int *val)
{
int ret = X509_NOT_OK;
int len;
(*offset) += 2; /* get past explicit tag */
if (cert[(*offset)++] != ASN1_INTEGER)
return X509_NOT_OK;
len = get_asn1_length(cert, offset);
if (len == 1)
{
ret = cert[*offset];
}
*offset += len;
return ret;
return asn1_get_int(cert, offset, val);
}
/**
@@ -463,8 +544,8 @@ int asn1_public_key(const uint8_t *cert, int *offset, X509_CTX *x509_ctx)
if (asn1_next_obj(cert, offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE) < 0)
goto end_pub_key;
mod_len = asn1_get_int(cert, offset, &modulus);
pub_len = asn1_get_int(cert, offset, &pub_exp);
mod_len = asn1_get_big_int(cert, offset, &modulus);
pub_len = asn1_get_big_int(cert, offset, &pub_exp);
RSA_pub_key_new(&x509_ctx->rsa_ctx, modulus, mod_len, pub_exp, pub_len);
@@ -584,7 +665,7 @@ int asn1_find_oid(const uint8_t* cert, int* offset,
return 0;
}
int asn1_find_subjectaltname(const uint8_t* cert, int offset)
int asn1_is_subject_alt_name(const uint8_t *cert, int offset)
{
if (asn1_find_oid(cert, &offset, sig_subject_alt_name,
sizeof(sig_subject_alt_name)))
@@ -595,6 +676,39 @@ int asn1_find_subjectaltname(const uint8_t* cert, int offset)
return 0;
}
int asn1_is_basic_constraints(const uint8_t *cert, int offset)
{
if (asn1_find_oid(cert, &offset, sig_basic_constraints,
sizeof(sig_basic_constraints)))
{
return offset;
}
return 0;
}
int asn1_is_key_usage(const uint8_t *cert, int offset)
{
if (asn1_find_oid(cert, &offset, sig_key_usage,
sizeof(sig_key_usage)))
{
return offset;
}
return 0;
}
bool asn1_is_critical_ext(const uint8_t *buf, int *offset)
{
/* critical is optional */
bool res = false;
if (asn1_next_obj(buf, offset, ASN1_BOOLEAN) == 1)
res = buf[(*offset)++] == 0xFF;
return res;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_SSL_CERT_VERIFICATION */
/**

45
ssl/crypto_misc.h
View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2007-2015, Cameron Rich
* Copyright (c) 2007-2016, Cameron Rich
*
* All rights reserved.
*
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ extern "C" {
#define X509_VFY_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST -8
#define X509_INVALID_PRIV_KEY -9
#define X509_MAX_CERTS -10
#define X509_VFY_ERROR_BASIC_CONSTRAINT -11
/*
* The Distinguished Name
@@ -68,6 +69,21 @@ extern "C" {
#define X509_COUNTRY 4
#define X509_STATE 5
/*
* Key Usage bits
*/
#define IS_SET_KEY_USAGE_FLAG(A, B) (A->key_usage & B)
#define KEY_USAGE_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE 0x0001
#define KEY_USAGE_CONTENT_COMMITMENT 0x0002
#define KEY_USAGE_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT 0x0004
#define KEY_USAGE_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT 0x0008
#define KEY_USAGE_KEY_AGREEMENT 0x0010
#define KEY_USAGE_KEY_CERT_SIGN 0x0020
#define KEY_USAGE_CRL_SIGN 0x0040
#define KEY_USAGE_ENCIPHER_ONLY 0x0080
#define KEY_USAGE_DECIPHER_ONLY 0x0100
struct _x509_ctx
{
char *ca_cert_dn[X509_NUM_DN_TYPES];
@@ -76,12 +92,19 @@ struct _x509_ctx
time_t not_before;
time_t not_after;
uint8_t *signature;
uint16_t sig_len;
uint8_t sig_type;
RSA_CTX *rsa_ctx;
bigint *digest;
uint8_t *fingerprint;
uint8_t *spki_sha256;
uint16_t sig_len;
uint8_t sig_type;
bool basic_constraint_present;
bool basic_constraint_is_critical;
bool key_usage_present;
bool key_usage_is_critical;
bool basic_constaint_cA;
int basic_constraint_pathLenConstraint;
uint32_t key_usage;
struct _x509_ctx *next;
};
@@ -97,7 +120,8 @@ typedef struct
int x509_new(const uint8_t *cert, int *len, X509_CTX **ctx);
void x509_free(X509_CTX *x509_ctx);
#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_CERT_VERIFICATION
int x509_verify(const CA_CERT_CTX *ca_cert_ctx, const X509_CTX *cert);
int x509_verify(const CA_CERT_CTX *ca_cert_ctx, const X509_CTX *cert,
int *pathLenConstraint);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_FULL_MODE
void x509_print(const X509_CTX *cert, CA_CERT_CTX *ca_cert_ctx);
@@ -107,6 +131,7 @@ const char * x509_display_error(int error);
/**************************************************************************
* ASN1 declarations
**************************************************************************/
#define ASN1_BOOLEAN 0x01
#define ASN1_INTEGER 0x02
#define ASN1_BIT_STRING 0x03
#define ASN1_OCTET_STRING 0x04
@@ -139,15 +164,21 @@ uint32_t get_asn1_length(const uint8_t *buf, int *offset);
int asn1_get_private_key(const uint8_t *buf, int len, RSA_CTX **rsa_ctx);
int asn1_next_obj(const uint8_t *buf, int *offset, int obj_type);
int asn1_skip_obj(const uint8_t *buf, int *offset, int obj_type);
int asn1_get_int(const uint8_t *buf, int *offset, uint8_t **object);
int asn1_version(const uint8_t *cert, int *offset, X509_CTX *x509_ctx);
int asn1_get_big_int(const uint8_t *buf, int *offset, uint8_t **object);
int asn1_get_int(const uint8_t *buf, int *offset, int32_t *val);
int asn1_get_bool(const uint8_t *buf, int *offset, bool *val);
int asn1_get_bit_string_as_int(const uint8_t *buf, int *offset, uint32_t *val);
int asn1_version(const uint8_t *cert, int *offset, int *val);
int asn1_validity(const uint8_t *cert, int *offset, X509_CTX *x509_ctx);
int asn1_name(const uint8_t *cert, int *offset, char *dn[]);
int asn1_public_key(const uint8_t *cert, int *offset, X509_CTX *x509_ctx);
#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_CERT_VERIFICATION
int asn1_signature(const uint8_t *cert, int *offset, X509_CTX *x509_ctx);
int asn1_find_subjectaltname(const uint8_t* cert, int offset);
int asn1_compare_dn(char * const dn1[], char * const dn2[]);
int asn1_is_subject_alt_name(const uint8_t *cert, int offset);
int asn1_is_basic_constraints(const uint8_t *cert, int offset);
int asn1_is_key_usage(const uint8_t *cert, int offset);
bool asn1_is_critical_ext(const uint8_t *buf, int *offset);
#endif /* CONFIG_SSL_CERT_VERIFICATION */
int asn1_signature_type(const uint8_t *cert,
int *offset, X509_CTX *x509_ctx);

6
ssl/p12.c
View File

@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ int pkcs8_decode(SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx, SSLObjLoader *ssl_obj, const char *password)
}
/* unencrypted key? */
if (asn1_get_int(buf, &offset, &version) > 0 && *version == 0)
if (asn1_get_big_int(buf, &offset, &version) > 0 && *version == 0)
{
ret = p8_add_key(ssl_ctx, buf);
goto error;
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ int pkcs12_decode(SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx, SSLObjLoader *ssl_obj, const char *password)
goto error;
}
if (asn1_get_int(buf, &offset, &version) < 0 || *version != 3)
if (asn1_get_big_int(buf, &offset, &version) < 0 || *version != 3)
{
ret = SSL_ERROR_INVALID_VERSION;
goto error;
@@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ static int get_pbe_params(uint8_t *buf, int *offset,
*salt = &buf[*offset];
*offset += len;
if ((len = asn1_get_int(buf, offset, &iter)) < 0)
if ((len = asn1_get_big_int(buf, offset, &iter)) < 0)
goto error;
*iterations = 0;

5
ssl/tls1.c
View File

@@ -2090,8 +2090,11 @@ error:
EXP_FUNC int STDCALL ssl_verify_cert(const SSL *ssl)
{
int ret;
int pathLenConstraint = 0;
SSL_CTX_LOCK(ssl->ssl_ctx->mutex);
ret = x509_verify(ssl->ssl_ctx->ca_cert_ctx, ssl->x509_ctx);
ret = x509_verify(ssl->ssl_ctx->ca_cert_ctx, ssl->x509_ctx,
&pathLenConstraint);
SSL_CTX_UNLOCK(ssl->ssl_ctx->mutex);
if (ret) /* modify into an SSL error type */

6
ssl/tls1_svr.c
View File

@@ -92,8 +92,10 @@ int do_svr_handshake(SSL *ssl, int handshake_type, uint8_t *buf, int hs_len)
if (ret == SSL_OK) /* verify the cert */
{
int cert_res;
cert_res = x509_verify(
ssl->ssl_ctx->ca_cert_ctx, ssl->x509_ctx);
int pathLenConstraint = 0;
cert_res = x509_verify(ssl->ssl_ctx->ca_cert_ctx,
ssl->x509_ctx, &pathLenConstraint);
ret = (cert_res == 0) ? SSL_OK : SSL_X509_ERROR(cert_res);
}
break;

208
ssl/x509.c
View File

@@ -42,6 +42,13 @@
#include "crypto_misc.h"
#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_CERT_VERIFICATION
static int x509_v3_subject_alt_name(const uint8_t *cert, int offset,
X509_CTX *x509_ctx);
static int x509_v3_basic_constraints(const uint8_t *cert, int offset,
X509_CTX *x509_ctx);
static int x509_v3_key_usage(const uint8_t *cert, int offset,
X509_CTX *x509_ctx);
/**
* Retrieve the signature from a certificate.
*/
@@ -95,11 +102,10 @@ int x509_new(const uint8_t *cert, int *len, X509_CTX **ctx)
if (asn1_next_obj(cert, &offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE) < 0)
goto end_cert;
if (cert[offset] == ASN1_EXPLICIT_TAG) /* optional version */
{
if ((version = asn1_version(cert, &offset, x509_ctx)) == X509_NOT_OK)
/* optional version */
if (cert[offset] == ASN1_EXPLICIT_TAG &&
asn1_version(cert, &offset, &version) == X509_NOT_OK)
goto end_cert;
}
if (asn1_skip_obj(cert, &offset, ASN1_INTEGER) || /* serial number */
asn1_next_obj(cert, &offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE) < 0)
@@ -197,50 +203,11 @@ int x509_new(const uint8_t *cert, int *len, X509_CTX **ctx)
break;
}
if (version == 2 && cert[offset] == ASN1_V3_DATA)
if (version == 2 && asn1_next_obj(cert, &offset, ASN1_V3_DATA) > 0)
{
int suboffset;
++offset;
get_asn1_length(cert, &offset);
if ((suboffset = asn1_find_subjectaltname(cert, offset)) > 0)
{
if (asn1_next_obj(cert, &suboffset, ASN1_OCTET_STRING) > 0)
{
int altlen;
if ((altlen = asn1_next_obj(cert,
&suboffset, ASN1_SEQUENCE)) > 0)
{
int endalt = suboffset + altlen;
int totalnames = 0;
while (suboffset < endalt)
{
int type = cert[suboffset++];
int dnslen = get_asn1_length(cert, &suboffset);
if (type == ASN1_CONTEXT_DNSNAME)
{
x509_ctx->subject_alt_dnsnames = (char**)
realloc(x509_ctx->subject_alt_dnsnames,
(totalnames + 2) * sizeof(char*));
x509_ctx->subject_alt_dnsnames[totalnames] =
(char*)malloc(dnslen + 1);
x509_ctx->subject_alt_dnsnames[totalnames+1] = NULL;
memcpy(x509_ctx->subject_alt_dnsnames[totalnames],
cert + suboffset, dnslen);
x509_ctx->subject_alt_dnsnames[
totalnames][dnslen] = 0;
++totalnames;
}
suboffset += dnslen;
}
}
}
}
x509_v3_subject_alt_name(cert, offset, x509_ctx);
x509_v3_basic_constraints(cert, offset, x509_ctx);
x509_v3_key_usage(cert, offset, x509_ctx);
}
offset = end_tbs; /* skip the rest of v3 data */
@@ -268,6 +235,106 @@ end_cert:
return ret;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_CERT_VERIFICATION /* only care if doing verification */
static int x509_v3_subject_alt_name(const uint8_t *cert, int offset,
X509_CTX *x509_ctx)
{
if ((offset = asn1_is_subject_alt_name(cert, offset)) > 0)
{
/* ignore if present */
asn1_is_critical_ext(cert, &offset);
if (asn1_next_obj(cert, &offset, ASN1_OCTET_STRING) > 0)
{
int altlen;
if ((altlen = asn1_next_obj(cert, &offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE)) > 0)
{
int endalt = offset + altlen;
int totalnames = 0;
while (offset < endalt)
{
int type = cert[offset++];
int dnslen = get_asn1_length(cert, &offset);
if (type == ASN1_CONTEXT_DNSNAME)
{
x509_ctx->subject_alt_dnsnames = (char**)
realloc(x509_ctx->subject_alt_dnsnames,
(totalnames + 2) * sizeof(char*));
x509_ctx->subject_alt_dnsnames[totalnames] =
(char*)malloc(dnslen + 1);
x509_ctx->subject_alt_dnsnames[totalnames+1] = NULL;
memcpy(x509_ctx->subject_alt_dnsnames[totalnames],
cert + offset, dnslen);
x509_ctx->subject_alt_dnsnames[
totalnames][dnslen] = 0;
++totalnames;
}
offset += dnslen;
}
}
}
}
return X509_OK;
}
/**
* Basic constraints - see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#page-39
*/
static int x509_v3_basic_constraints(const uint8_t *cert, int offset,
X509_CTX *x509_ctx)
{
int ret = X509_OK;
if ((offset = asn1_is_basic_constraints(cert, offset)) == 0)
goto end_contraints;
x509_ctx->basic_constraint_present = true;
x509_ctx->basic_constraint_is_critical =
asn1_is_critical_ext(cert, &offset);
if (asn1_next_obj(cert, &offset, ASN1_OCTET_STRING) < 0 ||
asn1_next_obj(cert, &offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE) < 0 ||
asn1_get_bool(cert, &offset, &x509_ctx->basic_constaint_cA) < 0 ||
asn1_get_int(cert, &offset,
&x509_ctx->basic_constraint_pathLenConstraint) < 0)
{
ret = X509_NOT_OK;
}
end_contraints:
return ret;
}
/*
* Key usage - see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.3
*/
static int x509_v3_key_usage(const uint8_t *cert, int offset,
X509_CTX *x509_ctx)
{
int ret = X509_OK;
if ((offset = asn1_is_key_usage(cert, offset)) == 0)
goto end_key_usage;
x509_ctx->key_usage_present = true;
x509_ctx->key_usage_is_critical = asn1_is_critical_ext(cert, &offset);
if (asn1_next_obj(cert, &offset, ASN1_OCTET_STRING) < 0 ||
asn1_get_bit_string_as_int(cert, &offset, &x509_ctx->key_usage))
{
ret = X509_NOT_OK;
}
end_key_usage:
return ret;
}
#endif
/**
* Free an X.509 object's resources.
*/
@@ -371,8 +438,10 @@ static bigint *sig_verify(BI_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *sig, int sig_len,
* - That the certificate(s) are not self-signed.
* - The certificate chain is valid.
* - The signature of the certificate is valid.
* - Basic constraints
*/
int x509_verify(const CA_CERT_CTX *ca_cert_ctx, const X509_CTX *cert)
int x509_verify(const CA_CERT_CTX *ca_cert_ctx, const X509_CTX *cert,
int *pathLenConstraint)
{
int ret = X509_OK, i = 0;
bigint *cert_sig;
@@ -415,6 +484,13 @@ int x509_verify(const CA_CERT_CTX *ca_cert_ctx, const X509_CTX *cert)
goto end_verify;
}
if (cert->basic_constaint_cA &&
IS_SET_KEY_USAGE_FLAG(cert, KEY_USAGE_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
{
ret = X509_VFY_ERROR_BASIC_CONSTRAINT;
goto end_verify;
}
next_cert = cert->next;
/* last cert in the chain - look for a trusted cert */
@@ -425,14 +501,29 @@ int x509_verify(const CA_CERT_CTX *ca_cert_ctx, const X509_CTX *cert)
/* go thu the CA store */
while (i < CONFIG_X509_MAX_CA_CERTS && ca_cert_ctx->cert[i])
{
/* ignore CA certs that are not really CA certs */
if (cert->basic_constraint_present &&
!ca_cert_ctx->cert[i]->basic_constaint_cA)
continue;
if (asn1_compare_dn(cert->ca_cert_dn,
ca_cert_ctx->cert[i]->cert_dn) == 0)
{
/* use this CA certificate for signature verification */
match_ca_cert = 1;
match_ca_cert = true;
ctx = ca_cert_ctx->cert[i]->rsa_ctx->bi_ctx;
mod = ca_cert_ctx->cert[i]->rsa_ctx->m;
expn = ca_cert_ctx->cert[i]->rsa_ctx->e;
if (ca_cert_ctx->cert[i]->basic_constaint_cA &&
ca_cert_ctx->cert[i]->
basic_constraint_pathLenConstraint <
*pathLenConstraint)
{
ret = X509_VFY_ERROR_BASIC_CONSTRAINT;
goto end_verify;
}
break;
}
@@ -491,7 +582,8 @@ int x509_verify(const CA_CERT_CTX *ca_cert_ctx, const X509_CTX *cert)
/* go down the certificate chain using recursion. */
if (next_cert != NULL)
{
ret = x509_verify(ca_cert_ctx, next_cert);
ret = x509_verify(ca_cert_ctx, next_cert, pathLenConstraint);
(*pathLenConstraint)++; /* don't include last certificate */
}
end_verify:
@@ -603,8 +695,19 @@ void x509_print(const X509_CTX *cert, CA_CERT_CTX *ca_cert_ctx)
if (ca_cert_ctx)
{
int pathLenConstraint = 0;
printf("Verify:\t\t\t\t%s\n",
x509_display_error(x509_verify(ca_cert_ctx, cert)));
x509_display_error(x509_verify(ca_cert_ctx, cert,
&pathLenConstraint)));
}
if (cert->basic_constraint_present)
{
printf("Basic Constraints:\t\t%s, CA:%s, pathlen:%d\n",
cert->basic_constraint_is_critical ?
"critical" : "NOT critical",
cert->basic_constaint_cA? "TRUE" : "FALSE",
cert->basic_constraint_pathLenConstraint);
}
#if 0
@@ -655,6 +758,9 @@ const char * x509_display_error(int error)
case X509_INVALID_PRIV_KEY:
return "Invalid private key";
case X509_VFY_ERROR_BASIC_CONSTRAINT:
return "Basic constraint invalid";
default:
return "Unknown";
}